msc seascape yacht club rooms

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MSC Seascape Cabins & Suites

MSC Seascape features new cabins designed to suit all your needs during your holiday. Choose among different types of cabins and suites with balconies including the coveted aft suits, terraced suites with extended balconies and different suites with outdoor private whirlpools. And get to know an unparalleled accommodation experience at the 2 new palatial  Owner’s Suites  at the largest and most luxurious MSC Yacht Club.

• Comfortable king bed
• Large balcony with private whirlpool bath and outdoor living area
• Separate living area and dining room
• Walk-in closet and luggage storage
• Panoramic glass wall
• Bathroom with large shower and bathtub, vanity area and hairdryer
• Interactive TV, telephone, safe and minibar.
• Complimentary Wi-Fi
• Can accommodate up to 4 people
• Approx. 1,055 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 65 ft 2
• Located on deck 19

Discover a world of privileges with MSC Yacht Club.

The image is representative only; the size, layout and furniture may vary (within the same stateroom category).

• Large balcony with a private whirlpool bath and dining room table
• Walk-in closet
• Bathroom with shower and bathtub, vanity area and hairdryer
• Interactive TV, telephone, safe and minibar
• Approx. 667 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 355 ft 2
• Located on deck 16
• Comfortable king bed that can be converted into two single beds on request
• Located on the top deck*
• Separate living area
• Bathroom with large shower, vanity area and hairdryer
• Accommodates up to 5 guests
• Approx. 269 - 463 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 86 – 129 ft 2
• Located on decks 16-19

* Except staterooms 18019, 18018, 16027 and 16020. S ize, layout and furniture may vary from that shown (within the same stateroom category).

• Sitting area with sofa
• Spacious closet
• Bathroom with shower or bathtub, vanity area and hairdryer
• Approx. 269 - 366 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 86 ft 2
•  Located on decks 16-19
• Approx. 226 ft 2
• Located on decks 16 and 18
• Two-bedroom Suite
• - Bedroom 1: Comfortable king bed
• - Bedroom 2: Two single beds
• Two bathrooms
• - Bathroom 1: Shower, vanity area and hairdryer
• - Bathroom 2: Bathtub, vanity area and hairdryer
• Sitting area with sofa or separate living area
• Wi-Fi access available ($)
• Can accommodate up to 6 guests
• Approx. 527 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 183 ft 2
• Located on decks 11-14
• Select staterooms can accommodate up to 5 guests
• Approx. 377 – 527 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 32.2917– 226.042 ft 2
• Located on decks 9-13
• Spacious wardrobe
• Can accommodate up to 5 people
• Approx. 301 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 75 ft 2   with its own private whirlpool bath
• Located on decks 9-15
• Approx. 301 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 409 ft 2
•  Located on deck 9
• Approx. 280 – 344 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 97 – 151 ft 2
• Approx. 183 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 172 ft 2
• Located on deck 9

The image is representative only; the size, layout and furniture may vary (within the same cabin category).

Important: this cabin will be available for cruises with departure dates starting from 5th April 2025.

• Approx. 183 ft 2  with a balcony that is approx. 54 - 97 ft 2

* Some staterooms have a metal balcony front instead of glass.

• Approx. 172-183 ft 2  with a balcony that is approx. 54 - 65 ft 2
• Located on decks 11-12
• Window with sea view
• Bathroom with shower, vanity area and hairdryer
• Approx. 183 ft 2
• Located on deck 5
• Approx. 301 ft 2
• Located on deck 10

* Some staterooms for guests with disabilities or reduced mobility have a non-convertible king bed.

• Approx. 151 ft 2
• Located on decks 5-10

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MSC Cruises

What is the MSC Yacht Club? Take a look at MSC Cruises’ luxury suite area

MSC Cruises sails nearly two dozen beautiful ships from home ports around the world, but their inviting sun decks can be crowded, and you're likely to encounter queues for dinner, shows and guest services.

The trick to creating a more luxurious experience on this big-ship cruise line is to book a stay in the line's Yacht Club. This upscale enclave within MSC Cruises ' larger ships offers guests more spacious accommodations, butler service and dedicated restaurants and lounges — even coffee delivered to your room each morning, just the way you like it.

Because of the Yacht Club , MSC can offer an inviting experience for cruisers who like big-ship cruising but crave more elevated accommodations, dining and amenities. MSC Cruises was one of the first lines to introduce this ship-within-a-ship concept, along with Norwegian Cruise Line . Now other popular cruise lines, such as Royal Caribbean , also have adopted it.

The Yacht Club section on several of MSC Cruises' ships offers gated access to semi-private dining, butler service and more, but it comes at a price. Find out how much you can expect to pay and what you'll get for your money.

What are the MSC Yacht Club perks?

All stays in the Yacht Club include priority check-in and checkout; priority disembarkation and boarding on shore excursions days; free premium alcohol and Wi-Fi packages; a bathrobe and slippers; complimentary access to the Aurea Spa thermal suite; 24-hour concierge and butler services (dining and spa reservations, unpacking and repacking, morning coffee delivery, etc.); a free daily in-cabin newspaper of your choice, delivered; and the ability to change your cruise one time without penalty.

Yacht Club cruisers are also entitled to discounts of 10% on spa treatments, 20% on specialty dining packages and 40% on spa packages.

In addition, passengers booked in the Yacht Club have access to their own dedicated bar, lounge and restaurant, as well as a semi-private outdoor bar, pool and hot tubs, all on an exclusive sun deck. When ships dock at the line's private island, Ocean Cay Marine Reserve , Yacht Club passengers have private beach and restaurant access .

In their cabins, Yacht Club cruisers will find a pillow menu, memory foam mattresses, high-quality linens, bathrooms with marble floors, a specialty coffee maker, complimentary open minibar access, one gratis bottle of spirits (choose from a list of available options), free one-time snacks, 24-hour room service and nightly turn-down chocolates from Venchi, an Italian chocolatier that partners with the cruise line.

Which MSC cruise ships have the Yacht Club?

Thirteen ships in the MSC Cruises fleet have the Yacht Club on board:

• MSC Bellissima
• MSC Euribia
• MSC Fantasia
• MSC Grandiosa
• MSC Meraviglia
• MSC Preziosa
• MSC Seascape.
• MSC Seashore.
• MSC Seaside
• MSC Seaview
• MSC Splendida
• MSC Virtuosa
• MSC World Europa

Upcoming vessel MSC World America (2025) also will have the Yacht Club.

The largest Yacht Club in the fleet is on MSC World Europa, offering 152 suites. The second-largest is found on the line's two Seaside EVO Class ships, MSC Seashore and MSC Seascape, which each have 131 suites.

MSC Yacht Club cabins

All accommodations in the Yacht Club are labeled as suites, even though they comprise some standard cabin types. The specific stateroom types offered will vary by ship, but in general, they range from windowless interior cabins and deluxe balcony rooms to Executive and Royal Suites with more space, walk-in closets and bathrooms with both showers and bathtubs.

New to the fleet with the line's World Class are 1,600-square-foot Owner Suites, which include multi-room layouts, walk-in closets, bathtubs and balconies, each with a whirlpool and alfresco dining area.

Also new are Duplex Suites, offering two decks of space, with the bedroom and bathroom upstairs and a dining area, living room and guest bath downstairs. These also include two private sun decks with loungers, one of which boasts a whirlpool.

How much does it cost to stay in the MSC Yacht Club?

As you might expect, the cost to stay in the Yacht Club depends on several factors, including cabin type, the length of the sailing and where you're going and when. However, in line with the rest of the brand's pricing, a stay in the Yacht Club is an excellent value when you compare it to stays in other lines' dedicated suite areas or to luxury cruise prices.

I priced out several sailings departing over the next two years on some of the line's newest and largest ships. This is what was available at press time. (Note: MSC Cruises' website will only allow me to choose a general Yacht Club designation when booking. That means a guaranteed suite within the Yacht Club, but you won't know what type it is until closer to sailing.)

• 7-night Caribbean and Bahamas cruise on MSC Seascape: $6,538 (including taxes) for two adults, round trip from Miami, March 16-23, 2024
• 11-night Bermuda, Canada and New England cruise on MSC Meraviglia: $9,958 (including taxes) for two adults, round trip from Brooklyn, New York, Sept. 25-Oct. 6, 2024
• 7-night Mediterranean cruise on MSC World Europa: $5,118 (including taxes) for two adults, round trip from Barcelona, May 2-9, 2025
• 7-night Mediterranean on MSC Divina: $5,858 (including taxes) for two adults, round trip from Kusadasi, Turkey, June 5-12, 2025

Check out the MSC Cruises website to learn more about the MSC Yacht Club .

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MSC Seascape Cabins & Suites

MSC Seascape features new cabins designed to suit all your needs during your holiday. Choose among different types of cabins and suites with balconies including the coveted aft suits, terraced suites with extended balconies and different suites with outdoor private whirlpools. And get to know an unparalleled accommodation experience at the 2 new palatial  Owner’s Suites  at the largest and most luxurious MSC Yacht Club.

• Surface 98 sqm, balcony 25 sqm, deck 19
• Large balcony with private whirlpool bath and outdoor living area
• Separate living area and dining room
• Walk-in wardrobe and luggage storage
• Panoramic glass wall
• Bathroom with large shower and bathtub, vanity area with hairdryer
• Comfortable double bed
• Interactive TV, telephone, safe and minibar.
• Wifi connection included
• Can accomodate up to 4 people

Discover a world of privileges with MSC Yacht Club including:

• 24-Hour Butler service and dedicated concierge
• Premium Extra Drink and Internet packages included
• Complimentary Access to the Thermal Suite in the MSC Aurea SPA
• Balinese massage package and Specialty restaurants package, available up to 2 days prior to embarkation; 10% discount on all spa treatments purchased on board..
• 1 Free cruise change

The image is representative only; the size, layout and furniture may vary (within the same cabin category).

• Surface 62 sqm, balcony 33 sqm, deck 16
• Balcony with private whirlpool bath and dining table
• Walk-in wardrobes
• Bathroom with shower and bathtub, vanity area with hairdryer
• Interactive TV, telephone, safe and minibar
• Surface 25-43 sqm, balcony 8-21 sqm, deck 16-19
• Living area
• Spacious balcony
• Located on the top deck*
• Walk-in wardrobe
• Bathroom with large shower and vanity area with hairdryer
• Comfortable double bed or single beds (on request)
• Can accomodate up to 5 people

*Except cabins 18019, 18018, 16027 and 16020. 

Size, layout and furniture may vary from that shown (within the same cabin category)

The image is representative only.

• Surface 25 sqm, balcony 8, deck 16-19
• Sitting area with sofa
• Spacious wardrobe
• Bathroom with shower or bathtub, vanity area with hairdryer
• Comfortable double or single beds (on request)
• Surface 21 sqm, deck 16-19
• Wifi cnnection included
• Surface 49 sqm, balcony 17 sqm, deck 11-14
• Sitting area with sofa or separate living area
• Two bathrooms, one with bathtub and one with shower, vanity areas with hairdryers
• 2 bedrooms, one with double bed and one with two single beds
• Interactive TV, telephone, Wifi connection available (for a fee), safe and minibar
• Can accomodate up to 6 people
• Surface 35-49 sqm, large balcony 3-21 sqm, deck 9-13
• Can accommodate up to 5 people
• Comfortable king bed that can be converted into two single beds on request
• Bathroom with shower or bathtub, vanity area and hairdryer
• Wi-Fi access available ($)
• Approx. 301 ft 2 with a balcony that is approx. 75 ft 2   with its own private whirlpool bath
• Located on decks 9-15

The image is representative only; the size, layout and furniture may vary (within the same stateroom category).

• Surface approx 28 sqm, balcony approx 38 sqm, deck 9
• Spacious Wardrobe
• Surface approx 26-32 sqm, balcony approx 9-14 sqm, deck 9-15
• Surface approx  17 sqm, balcony approx 16 sqm, deck 9

Important : this cabin will be available for cruises with departure dates starting from 5th April 2025 .

• Surface  17 sqm, balcony 5 sqm, deck 9-15

*Some cabins have a metal balcony front, instead of glass.

• Surface  17 sqm, balcony 5 sqm, deck 9-10
• Surface approx 17 sqm, deck 5
• Window with sea view
• Bathroom with shower, vanity area with hairdryer
• Surface approx 28 sqm, deck 10
• Comfortable double or single beds (on request*)
• Interactive TV, telephone, wifi connection available (for a fee), safe and minibar

*Some cabins for guests with disabilities or reduced mobility have twin beds that can’t be converted into double beds.

• Surface approx 14 sqm, deck 5-10

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MSC Seascape Yacht Club Inside Suite

• Click here for ALL
• Balcony Suite
• Suite with Whirlpool Bath
• Grand Suite

Yacht Club Inside Suite

• Yacht Club Deluxe Suite
• Yacht Club Royal Suite
• Yacht Club Owner Suite
• Ship info and tracking
• Cabin Check

MSC Seascape Yacht Club Inside Suite cabin location, stateroom cabin videos, stateroom cabin pictures, floor plans, diagrams, stateroom features and perks. Cruisedeckplans.com also provides links to actual stateroom cabin pictures and videos on this page. You can see details and floor plans for all of MSC Seascape's different stateroom cabin categories on the NEW cabins page.

Stateroom Features

• Single or double (upon request) beds
• Spacious wardrobe
• Bath with shower
• Interactive TV
• Wifi connection (for a fee)
• Air conditioning
• Nespresso type machine.

Category Codes

   Yacht Club Interior Stateroom

Butler Service / Concierge Service / Priority Check In / Priority Luggage Delivery / Priority Debarkation / Priority Tender Boarding / Exclusive Lounge / Exclusive Dinner Restaurant / Priority Dining Reservations / Exclusive Pool / Exclusive Outdoor Lounge / Pillow Menu / 24-hour room service / Welcome package (Prosecco and chocolate box) / Access to Top Exclusive Solarium / Bathrobe and slippers in cabin / Access to Thermal area / 40% off dedicated Spa prepaid package / 10% off Spa treatments purchased on board / Premium Extra Drink Package / Premium Internet Package / Luggage packing/unpacking / Newspaper delivery upon request / MSC for ME wristband / Gourmet restaurant for breakfast, lunch and dinner / Panoramic Top Sail Lounge with bar /

Deck Locations

Deck 16  

Deck 18  

Yacht Club Inside Suite Typical Floor Plans

MSC Seascape Yacht Club Inside Suite pictures

MSC Seascape Yacht Club Inside Suite stateroom videos

Scroll over cabin (stateroom) tiles below to click and watch videos. Cruisedeckplans.com shows up to 10 of the most recent videos added to our collection on this page. Be sure to click the link in the section below to see other cabins we have videos for. The date shown is the date video was published. Use this to see decor changes.

Looking for specific Yacht Club Inside Suite cabins with pics/videos?

Other categories on msc seascape.

Click on a category below to go to that page. Stateroom cabin categories are simply the way that MSC groups the different types of staterooms (cabins). You can see details and floor plans for all of the categories on MSC Seascape on this page.

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This Brand-new Ship Has One of the Largest Yacht Clubs in Its Fleet, Endless Adventure, and a Glass-bottomed Bridge

MSC Seascape just set sail — here's what it's like on board.

Christine Burroni

The MSC Seascape may share many similar — or even identical — features with its predecessors, but when it comes to luxury, the fleet’s newest vessel certainly leveled up. The new ship sailed on its inaugural journey with guests from Rome to New York City this past weekend and will go on to sail out of Miami to the Caribbean for future trips.

While the European cruise line has become known for its luxury ship-within-a-ship concept, called Yacht Club , the Seascape boasts one of its largest clubs with 131 suites — with five categories to choose from — taking up 32,000 square feet. Located at the front of the ship, most exclusive Yacht Club spaces, like the private dining area or pool deck, are afforded sweeping ocean views.

Courtesy of MSC Cruises

In addition to a private restaurant with a regularly changing menu, and both indoor and outdoor lounge space, passengers who make a Yacht Club reservation are treated to expedited embarkation, 24-hour butler and concierge service, and access to the spa’s Thermal Suite where a sauna, steam room, and whirlpool awaits. Members will also have access to the ship's Top Sail Lounge for coffee, tea, and light bites at any time of day.

Yacht Club guests also enjoy the ship's premium drink package, an unpacking or packing service, a morning newspaper delivery of their choice, and the ability to select a specific pillow for customized comfort.

Sailing the blue water of the Caribbean while tucked in a super-exclusive setting may seem exceptionally relaxing, but the MSC Seascape also offers just the opposite for those looking for a bit of an adrenaline rush — with an extreme thrill ride and virtual reality experiences.

Adrenaline junkies can take a ride on the ship's Robotron , an attraction unique to the ship that will bring riders nearly 175 feet above water and flip upside down, moving in all directions to offer unobstructed 360-degree views. 

Those looking to keep their feet on the ground can still get their adventure fix with a walk across the Bridge of Sighs, a 72-foot-high glass-bottomed bridge.

The MSC Seascape is also home to a variety of virtual reality experiences. Riders can choose from Formula 1 racing, a flight simulator, and motorcycle riding.

“ MSC Seascape is an exciting addition to our fleet of Seaside Class ships with its elevated onboard experiences that will surprise and delight all ages," Ruben Rodriguez, President, MSC Cruises USA exclusively told Travel + Leisure. " From one of the largest and most luxurious Yacht Clubs in our fleet to interactive, high-tech experiences like the first Robotron at sea and immersive VR experiences, MSC Seascape brings unparalleled entertainment and thrills to our guests.”

Elsewhere on board, the ship’s interior is very similar to that of MSC’s other vessels, like the line's one-year-old MSC Seashore, including its Times Square–inspired décor, Swarovski crystal–adorned staircases, and Atrium space where live entertainment takes place.

Fans of the ship's fleet will also recognize its signature restaurants including Butcher's Cut steakhouse, Ocean Cay seafood restaurant, and more. Its lively sports bar is the perfect spot to catch any game around the world — and there are 18 other bars and lounges on board, some of which offer live music.

MSC Seascape journeys set sail from Miami to the Caribbean where passengers can visit the company's private Bahamas island, Ocean Cay MSC Marine Reserve.

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MSC Seascape deck plans

Deck layouts, review of facilities, activities, amenities.

MSC Seascape deck plan review at CruiseMapper provides newest cruise deck plans (2024-2025-2026 valid floor layouts of the vessel) extracted from the officially issued by MSC Cruises deckplan pdf (printable version).

Each of the MSC Seascape cruise ship deck plans are conveniently combined with a legend (showing cabin codes) and detailed review of all the deck's venues and passenger-accessible indoor and outdoor areas. A separate link provides an extensive information on MSC Seascape staterooms (cabins and suites), including photos, cabin plans and amenities by room type and category.

MSC Seascape (2022-built/ under construction ) is the second of MSC Cruises Seaside EVO-class liners - with sistership MSC Seashore (2021). In comparison the previous Seaside-class ships Seaside (2017) and Seaview (2018), Seascape is larger (339 m against 323 m), with 2270 staterooms (against 2067) and with bigger max passenger capacity (5877 against 4961) served by 1648 staff/crew (against 1413). Both classes (Seaside and Seaside-EVO) were designed for year-round operations in warm destinations

The MSC Seascape cruise ship deck plan shows 2270 staterooms for 4540 passengers (max capacity is 5877) served by 1648 crew-staff (818 crew cabins). The boat has 19 decks (12 passenger-accessible, 11 with cabins), 11 dining venues, 19 bars and lounges, 6 swimming pools, and features a 2-deck "Cabaret Rouge" (aft-located), Magrodome (sliding glass roof covering one of the swimming pools), an expanded Infinity Pool (with half-submerged concrete loungers/extends directly to the stern), 2x Infinity Whirlpools (portside and starboard Jacuzzis, with 10 seats each), main swimming pool (with both swimming and standing water depths and connected to the Pirate Cove Aquapark), 3x catwalks (glass-floored viewing platforms), Waterfront Promenade (length 540 m / 1770 ft).

Seascape's "MSC Yacht Club" is currently the fleet’s largest (total area 32000 ft2 / 2973 m2). The all-inclusive Suite complex (ship-within-a-ship concept) accommodates the highest-paying passengers (YC cabin categories only). It spreads over 4 decks and features a 3-deck high Onyx Wall (back-lit), Swarovski crystal-covered staircases, Top Sail Lounge (bar lounge with live music, gourmet canapes, complimentary beverages), exclusive restaurant (breakfast-lunch-dinner, premium wine list, daily-changed a la carte menu), poolside bar and grill. The private sundeck and pool area were expanded to 21000+ ft2 (1950 m2), with a bigger swimming pool and a panoramic Jacuzzi (8-seats, with individual controlled jets). The complex houses 131x Suites plus 2x Owner’s Suites (new category cabins sized 1054 ft2 / 98 m2) with larger terraces (outdoor hot tub, glass wall, dining and sundeck areas).

Seascape ship's outdoor deck space is also fleet's largest  (~13000 m2 / 140000 ft2) and includes the 540-m (1772-ft) long Promenade lined up with outdoor bars and dining venues.

MSC EVO ships main features include:

• Oceanview glass elevators (both their walls and floors are made of glass)
• Lower-positioned Lido-Pool Deck with a sea-level Promenade (circumnavigating the ship) enclosed by a glass wall and lined up with duty-free shops and dining venues with outdoor seating (restaurants, bars, club lounges)
• 11x different balcony cabin types, including 50x terraced cabins (overlooking Promenade Deck) and 32 Suites with Balcony Jacuzzi
• outdoor wellness facilities (spa and fitness) - including luxury cabanas (for outdoor spa treatments) and wellness cabins (with Kinesis Technogym equipment)
• double-deck Atrium with a transparent (oceanview) glass wall
• 3x catwalks (with glass floors and railings) extending beyond the ship
• top-deck Zip Line
• luxury suites (with Jacuzzi tubs on the balconies), connecting family cabins
• larger MSC Yacht Club complex (private lounge, solarium, swimming pool), larger Doremi playground (kids lounge with a LEGO room), larger Aqua Park (with 5 waterslides), more specialty restaurants with alfresco terraces (on Promenade Deck)
• 1100-seats theater (main show lounge), 5D Cinema, 6 swimming pools, 1 Infinity Pool, 2 Infinity Jacuzzies

MSC Seascape ship has 10x large-capacity eateries - 5x select restaurants (3x MDRs /main dining rooms, Aurea Restaurant, Yacht Club Restaurant) and 5x themed food venues (Seafood Restaurant, Steak House, Teppanyaki, Sushi Bar, Bistrot) plus 20x specialty bars and lounges.

Deck layouts

Deck 04 - tendering-hospital-crew, deck 05 - ilhabela-cabins-lobby, deck 06 - ibiza-shops1, deck 07 - mykonos-casino-lounge-shops2, deck 08 - ocean cay-promenade-spa-pools, deck 09 - gozo-cabins, deck 10 - tasmania-cabins, deck 11 - palawan-cabins, deck 12 - porquerolles-cabins, deck 13 - cozumel-cabins, deck 14 - maui-cabins, deck 15 - okinawa-cabins-bridge, deck 16 - suites-yacht club restaurant-sundeck-pools-kids, deck 18 - capri-suites-yacht club restaurant-sundeck1-pools-kids, deck 19 - suites-yacht club3-adventure trail1, deck 20 - portuguese island-yacht club sundeck-waterslides-sports-adventure trail2.

MSC Seascape deck plans are property of MSC Cruises . All deck layouts are for informational purposes only and CruiseMapper is not responsible for their accuracy.

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2024

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros

July 26, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click  here  to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click  here  to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click  here  to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:10pm ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.  Russian forces transferred the Central Grouping of Forces from the Kreminna area to the Avdiivka direction ahead of the Russian offensive operation to seize Avdiivka from October 2023 to February 2024 and proceeded to concentrate almost all Central Military District (CMD) elements deployed to Ukraine in the area during the offensive operation.[1] The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area.[2] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces made a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 and achieved significant tactical gains in the area, largely due to Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.[3] Ukrainian forces have since stabilized the front in the area and slowed the rate of Russian advance, and the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is now advancing at a relatively similar pace as Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine.

Russian forces began an offensive operation towards Toretsk in mid-June 2024 and also tasked the Central Grouping of Forces with the effort, and the Central Grouping of Forces redeployed the majority of the CMD's 27th Motorized Rifle Division from the Avdiivka area to Niu York (south of Toretsk).[4] Responsibility for the Toretsk effort has roughly doubled the length of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR and has already drawn notable manpower away from the Avdiivka effort. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on July 26 that elements of the CMD's 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) conducted the Russian reinforced battalion-size mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City on July 24, although ISW has yet to observe wider reports attributing the attack to the 90th Tank Division.[5] Elements of the Russian Eastern and Southern groupings of forces have previously conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City, and the commitment of CMD elements to the area in one of the largest mechanized assaults since Fall 2023 is a notable inflection.[6] The Central Grouping of Forces previously used elements of the 90th Tank Division as an operational reserve and committed those elements to intensify the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka in March 2024, during which elements of the 90th Tank Division conducted the last observed battalion-size mechanized assault in Ukraine.[7] The reported commitment of elements of the 90th Tank Division to the area southwest of Donetsk City suggests that the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR may be expanding southward as well, although the exact contours of the grouping's responsibilities are unclear. The commitment of elements of the 90th Tank Division to the area would also indicate that the Central Grouping of Forces is willing to allocate considerable manpower and equipment to other tactical and operational objectives outside of its existing operational focus on pursuing tactically significant gains in the Avdiivka area.

The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely.  Whether this possible assessment is based on waning Ukrainian materiel and manpower constraints or specifically based on an assessment of the Central Grouping of Forces' failure to achieve its assigned tasks is unclear. An AOR that stretches from southwest of Donetsk City to Toretsk will draw available Russian manpower and materiel away from the existing effort to make tactically significant advances northwest and west of Avdiivka. The Central Grouping of Forces likely lacks the reserves necessary to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area to the degree that would facilitate relatively rapid gains while maintaining offensive pressure in the Toretsk and Donetsk City directions. The Russian military command is currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure throughout the front to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative, and tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with grinding offensive operations along a longer front is more in line with this effort than tasking the grouping with achieving tactically significant gains through relatively rapid maneuver.[8]

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.  The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that it was clarifying the consequences of the strikes but that Russian air defense systems protecting the airbase failed to repel the strike. Russian opposition outlet  Astra  reported on July 26 that unspecified sources stated that Ukrainian forces launched four ATACMS against occupied Crimea and that Russian forces shot down two of the missiles.[10]  Astra  reported that Ukrainian ATACMS struck an ammunition depot at Saky Airbase and destroyed a radar station at an air defense deployment site five kilometers from occupied Shelkovychne (northwest of Saky Airbase). A Crimea-based Telegram channel also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot at the airbase.[11]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024. [12] Russian state news agency  RIA Novosti  reported that a source in Russian law enforcement stated that Bulgakov used his position in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to lobby for the Gryazinsky Food Plant, which the source claimed won catering contracts with the MoD and supplied low-quality food at high prices to the Russian military.[13] Russian authorities arrested top managers of the Gryazinsky Food Plant for embezzling funds from MoD contracts in April 2024, and Kremlin newswire TASS   stated on July 26 that Bulgakov's case materials indicate that Bulgakov is a suspect in the same case.[14] Bulgakov oversaw Russian military logistics as Deputy Defense Minister from 2008 to 2022, and the Kremlin awarded Bulgakov the Hero of Russia award in 2016.[15] The Russian MoD relieved Bulgakov of his post in September 2022 and stated that he had been transferred to another, unspecified position.[16] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities have been investigating Bulgakov since 2022 and have previously summoned Bulgakov as a witness in an unspecified number of MoD corruption cases.[17] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there had been talk "in narrow circles" about investigations into Bulgakov since May 2024.[18] Another Russian insider source claimed that Bulgakov was not closely connected to former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.[19] Russian milbloggers celebrated Bulgakov's arrest, who they claimed was responsible for systemic logistics issues at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that are still affecting the Russian military today.[20]

The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.  European Commission President Ursula von Der Leyen announced on July 26 that the EU transferred 1.5 billion euros (about $1.6 billion) from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine as a part of its support for Ukraine’s defense capabilities and reconstruction.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on July 26, claiming that Russia will not leave the European Commission's actions unanswered.[22]

The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia.  Russian authorities are increasingly signaling their intent to eventually block YouTube within Russia and will likely compel Russians to use social media platforms influenced or controlled by the Kremlin. Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor accused YouTube of "numerous violations" of Russian legislation and "disrespect" for Russia and its citizens and warned that these acts are grounds for "taking action" against YouTube.[23] Russian State Duma Committee on Information Policy Head Alexander Khinshtein stated that YouTube will load up to 40 percent slower in the coming days because Russian data centers cooperating with Google under unspecified "gray [area] schemes" intend to stop these schemes, a shift from Russian telecom giant Rostelecom's recent statement that slow YouTube load times within Russia are due to a lack of Russian servers hosting YouTube.[24] Russian internet authorities will likely throttle YouTube within Russia. Russian opposition outlet  Verstka  reported on July 26 citing a source within the Russian presidential administration that Russia aims to replace YouTube with  Vkontakte's  (VK) Video service and aims to download all Russian-language videos from YouTube to the VK service by Fall 2024.[25] VK is a Russian social media service currently headed by Vladimir Kiriyenko, the son of Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko. Sergei Kiriyenko oversees multiple information operations targeting Russia's domestic information space, Ukraine, and the West.[26]

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to create a culture of compliance with the Kremlin's censorship requirements, including only using Kremlin-approved programs and self-censoring opposition or other content unfavorable to the Kremlin's aims. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved a list of Russian software programs that Russian technology manufacturers must pre-install on smartphones, tablets, computers, smart televisions, and similar devices.[27] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated in reference to Russian censorship laws against "discrediting" Russian civil servants and the military that legislation should apply to both "ordinary life" and the internet and that Russian legislation is "expanding" accordingly, which is odd because Russia has prosecuted or otherwise censored many information space voices based on text or footage published online.[28]

Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25.  Dagestan's security forces told Kremlin newswire  TASS  that security forces evacuated an apartment building in Kaspiysk and detained an unspecified number of people intending to detonate an improvised explosive device (IED) in the building.[29] Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Spokesperson Gayana Gariyeva later announced that security forces completed their operation and that there is no remaining threat to the public.[30] The Russian government appears to be struggling with isolated terrorist activity following several significant terrorist attacks in recent months, including the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack and the June 2024 shootings in Dagestan.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
• The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.
• The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia.
• Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
• The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast   ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are operating in Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City and on the border with Belgorod Oblast). A Russian milblogger claimed on July 25 that Russian forces conducted a cross-border assault and entered Sotnytskyi Kozachok.[32] ISW has not observed recent visual evidence of Russian forces operating in Sotnytskyi Kozachok and continues to assess that Russian forces do not have an enduring presence in the settlement.[33] Another Russian milblogger amplified footage on July 26 purportedly showing four Russian glide bombs striking a Ukrainian military warehouse near Bilopillya, Sumy Oblast.[34]

Fighting continued north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian source reiterated claims that Russian forces have completely seized Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming that Russian forces are operating in western Hlyboke.[35] Positional fighting continued near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on July 25 and 26.[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful counterattacks north of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and near Hlyboke and Tykhe on July 25 and 26.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes near Lyptsi, Hlyboke, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Tykhe on July 26.[38] Elements of the 11th Separate Guards Engineering Brigade's (Southern Military District [SMD]) "Pheonix" Special Mining Battalion are purportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove and reportedly made further advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Andriivka (west of Svatove).[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces northwest of Svatove advanced south of Berestove, north of Pishchane, towards Hlushkivka, and into central Stelmakhivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) broke through Ukrainian defenses near Stelmakhivka and are preparing to conduct mechanized assaults in the area.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Stepova Novoselivka, Tabaivka, Pishchane; and Stelmakhivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Ploshchanka; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on July 25 and 26.[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Siversk on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Mykolaivka on July 25 and 26.[44] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Pereizne (south of Siversk), drone operators of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka, and elements of the "Sumrak" Battalion are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Mayske, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and near Chasiv Yar itself on July 25 and 26.[46] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near unspecified areas of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently crossed the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal near Kalynivka but that it is unknown if Russian forces consolidated these positions.[48]

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Toretsk on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 200 meters within Niu York (south of Toretsk), up to 600 meters towards Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), southwest of Yurivka (south of Toretsk), and within Pivnichne and Zalizne (both east of Toretsk).[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Toretsk near Pivnichne and Druzhba, southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne, and south of Toretsk near Niu York on July 25 and 26.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows elements of the Russian 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) raising a Russian flag in eastern Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka), indicating that Russian forces have most likely seized all of Yasnobrodivka.[51] Additional geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced near Prohres and Lozuvatske (both northwest of Avdiivka), indicating that Russian forces likely recently seized Lozuvatske.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.3 kilometers wide and 800 meters deep east of Lysychne (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Lozuvatske), up to 1.12 kilometers wide and 700 meters deep east of Vesele (northwest of Avdiivka and west of Prohres), and within Vovche (northwest of Avdiivka and south of Prohres) and Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka).[53] Russian forces also continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Tymofiivka, and Novozhelanne and west of Avdiivka near Karlivka on July 25 and 26.[54] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Vovche.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on July 26. Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within northern Krasnohorivka and up to 700 meters in eastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[57] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on July 25 and 26.[58] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Paraskoviivka, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[59]

Russian forces reportedly conducted another mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City) on July 25, following the reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault on July 24 near Kostyantynivka that resulted in significant vehicle losses. The Ukrainian brigade that defended against the July 24 attack later stated that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-size mechanized assault on July 25 with three tanks, 13 armored combat vehicles, 12 motorcycles, and roughly 200 personnel in the Kurakhove direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and two armored combat vehicles.[60] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight and that constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time.[61]

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 26 near Velyka Novosilka and Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Robotyne; north of Robotyne near Novoandriivka; northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Yurkivka; and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on July 25 and 26.[63] Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 4th Military Base, (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its "Valkyria" drone detachment, are reportedly fighting near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[64]

Positional fighting continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky on July 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[65] Elements of the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[66]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign  (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited number of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 22 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and Kursk Oblast.[67] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 20 Shahed drones over Kherson, Sumy, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv oblasts.[68] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported on July 26 that Russian forces struck Ukrenergo energy facilities in Zhytomyr and Chernihiv oblasts and damaged equipment.[69] Nizhyn Mayor Oleksandr Kodola stated that Russian forces also struck a hostel in Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast with a Shahed drone.[70] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on July 26 purporting to show Russian forces striking a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast with an Iskander-M ballistic missile, and Ukrainian Kramatorsk Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko reported that Russian forces struck industrial facilities within Kramatorsk.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities. RUSI reported that Russian cyber units have begun prioritizing targeting Ukrainian mobile devices in frontline areas in order to disrupt tactical logistics and operations and have shifted away from targeting Ukrainian civilian targets.[72] RUSI reported that Russian cyber units are attempting to access Ukrainian military devices through malware disguised as official military applications or messages or by hacking encrypted messaging applications (EMAs) like Telegram, Signal, and WhatsApp by siphoning messages and other files from these applications. RUSI assessed that Russian intelligence services likely intend to sabotage Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the future but are currently focused on disrupting tactical-level Ukrainian capabilities.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be cooperating with Rosgvardia to expand and improve medical services available to Russian servicemembers within Russia. The Russian MoD claimed on July 26 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov signed an agreement allowing military and Rosgvardia personnel to seek medical attention and undergo medical examinations for military medical commissions at both MoD and Rosgvardia medical facilities in Russia.[73] Belousov thanked Zolotov for helping to expand medical services for Russian personnel and claimed that this would improve medical treatment for personnel fighting in Ukraine. Russian deputy defense ministers Pavel Fradkov and Anna Tsivileva also visited a Southern Military District (SMD) military hospital on July 26 and noted that the Russian MoD is preparing to complete construction on the hospital in February 2025.[74] Fradkov emphasized that the Russian MoD views medical infrastructure as "extremely important." The Russian MoD may be concerned about its ability to provide adequate medical treatment to the increasing number of wounded personnel in and returning from Ukraine. Russian military officials, including Tsivileva, have recently tried to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine after outrage about the Russian military command reportedly sending injured soldiers to fight on the frontline.[75]

The Russian MoD continues efforts to improve training capacity for servicemembers. Belousov inspected a training center in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) on July 26, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov reported that instructors who served in Ukraine are conducting all the training exercises at the training grounds of the LMD.[76] Belousov also discussed further improving training programs for Russian servicemembers and constructing additional training grounds in the LMD.

Russian federal subjects continue to offer monetary incentives to entice Russians into military service. Rostov Oblast Head Vasily Golubev announced on July 26 that the Rostov Oblast government is increasing its one-time payment to Russian military recruits to 1.2 million rubles ($13,900) if recruits sign a military service contract between July 27 and August 31.[77] Golubev clarified that the Rostov Oblast government will pay the one-time bonus to Rostov Oblast residents and residents of other Russian federal subjects who travel to and sign military service contracts in Rostov Oblast. Other Russian oblasts have recently announced similar monetary incentives for contract military service.[78]

Russian outlet  Vedomosti  reported on July 26 that some banks in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have begun to unofficially label Chinese yuan notes that have been used in transactions with Russian companies as "dirty."[79] A member of the General Council of Delovaya Rossiya, a Russian business association, told  Vedomosti  that many PRC banks are unwilling to accept yuan with "Russian traces" and that one PRC bank refused to accept yuan notes purchased on the Moscow Exchange. PRC banks previously expressed concern about interactions with Russian entities and entities with ties to the Russian defense industry following the US authorization of secondary sanctions against financial institutes that facilitate Russian sanctions evasion.[80]

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian defense manufacturer "Laboratory 13" claimed on July 22 that it created the "Karman" miniature drone suppressor and is testing the portable anti-drone device among Russian forces in Ukraine.[81] "Laboratory 13" claimed that the device can operate autonomously by receiving signals from Laboratory 13's "Oko-P" drone detection devices.[82]

Russian drone manufacturer MiS Design Bureau claimed on July 25 that it has started serial production of an analog of the Ukrainian remote mining and bombardier "Baba Yaga" drone.[83] MiS Design Bureau claimed that it will serially produce the MiS-35 strike and reconnaissance hexacopter drone and that the drone will have a maximum payload capacity of 4.5 kilograms and a maximum range of nine kilometers.[84]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts  (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian structures through economic, infrastructure, and social programs. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on July 24 that Russia allocated more than 1.26 billion rubles (about $14.6 million) to socioeconomic programs in occupied Ukraine in 2023 involving 26 state-owned companies and 82 federal subjects with patronage over occupied areas.[85] Putin claimed that Russia built more than 19,000 new infrastructure objects, 200 medical sites, 1,300 educational institutions, and 8,000 kilometers of roads in 2023.

Kremlin officials continue efforts to distance themselves from their roles in the forced deportation and Russification of Ukrainian children. Russian Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova met with Turkish Ambassador to Russia Tanju Bilgic on July 23 and claimed that they discussed reuniting Ukrainian children with their parents in Russia and Ukraine and that Bilgic agreed to maintain contact regarding this issue.[86] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated on July 25 that occupation officials sent an unspecified number of Ukrainian children from Luhansk Oblast to a tent camp in Novosibirsk Oblast.[87]

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued their meeting on Valaam Island, Republic of Karelia on July 26.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024 ;

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2063

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid01HtV1USdbU2dkJJDmSPiH9YzZFwFR7dT8PpJqYJr7GkmU7STUtVXrufL9EHsw44vl

[10] https://t.me/astrapress/60447

[11] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/64456

[12] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/972628; https://ria dot ru/20240726/istochnik-1962196087.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124; https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cg3jx593p0xo

[13] https://ria dot ru/20240726/istochnik-1962196087.html

[14] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/20604725; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/21459387

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/262646

[16] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6862341

[17] https://t.me/rusbrief/253305

[18] https://t.me/rybar/62132

[19] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/15638

[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131309; https://t.me/milinfolive/126837 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/3465; https://t.me/treugolniklpr/47500 ;

[21] https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1816761973574353200?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1816761973574353200%7Ctwgr%5E6cfd4c60441d2ac75720ed29309ae058d9477297%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F799301-es-pererahue-ukraini-15-milarda-evro-vid-zamorozenih-aktiviv-rosii-evrokomisia%2F; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4029

[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/262636

[23] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21460069

[24] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21459685; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071224; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/21460069

[25] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/5343

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-29-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023

[27] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/news/2024/07/26/1052193-utverdil-spisok-programm

[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21455877; https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/russia-journalist-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-for-telegram-post; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-bogdanova-vchk-ogpu-foeign-agent/33034773.html; https://www.nuj.org.uk/resource/russia-journalist-sentenced-to-six-years-in-prison-over-telegram-post.html; https://www.npr.org/2024/07/23/nx-s1-5049473/russian-american-journalist-convicted-in-secret-trial; https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-prosecutor-seeks-18-year-sentence-us-journalist-gershkovich-agencies-2024-07-19/; https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-girkin-putin-critic-prison/32791526.html; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2023/08/31/blogger-andrey-kurshin-arrested-in-moscow-on-suspicion-of-spreading-fakes-about-russian-army

[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/262527 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/262530

[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/262537

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13072

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024

[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/48174; https://t.me/control_sigma/32192

[35] https://t.me/basurin_e/12942 ; https://t.me/ugra_ryadom/1941

[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/372 ; https://t.me/rybar/62115 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/48116 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13100 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57773 ;

[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/21211 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73251 ; https://t.me/rybar/62115; https://t.me/dva_majors/48116

[38]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/21223 ; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27571.5/4894639/

[40] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1816625278258676071; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1816625281664450859; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=488318913784598

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot/25446 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25455 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18479 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25454 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13096 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278

[42] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18479

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13096 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13101

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl

[45] https://t.me/rusich_army/16054; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1816537932247003212; https://t.me/BattalionSIGIRIYA/26 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21218

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/rusich_army/16051

[47] https://t.me/project_nd/127 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131288; https://t.me/rusich_army/16051

[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13074

[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/48116; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18470; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27396; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27400; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18470; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73254; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278

[51] https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1816622324021621043/history; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1816781858220196212 ;  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73276 ;  https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6162 ;

[52] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1816859176087273503; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=470081665665454;

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13081; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/57778

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73278; https://t.me/smotri_z/32831

[55] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18468

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6166; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/791

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot/25444; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13103

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21211 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73246

[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/73246; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12516

[60] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12109 ; https://t.me/odshbr79/245

[61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mTQr8HPcLoiTSapskx9eHdZgppR6nksqvVu2fqk7NnJx9HByNQJZ6bLvD8aCRbxzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0iAx15bVZRcToHfFNBFPen1bVDgZjvEig4TNyvzjio95eBFGreAmgkGQJSPqZV9HUl&id=61558717479769; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/26/na-pivdennomu-napryamku-zafiksuvaly-prolit-ponad-320-rozviduvalnyh-droniv-protyvnyka/

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/131265

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0e5CUiPSCNAswcagEQY4ytdLSnQBSiENewZqwcSW1bTA1rM6EuoDHr6gUSfjoj3rJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0XrogtpT2b2EwXGuKdKXRFkXxnpXnMmKoz48g9WPdikw4caqckqGioCEoCRxK1WLZl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035QBZMFUYS9np91QF5aQ5TpYsa2xRkonNbf6wKEs614Rq6Gb5cYURWkSnfqvgFSSBl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10672; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0iAx15bVZRcToHfFNBFPen1bVDgZjvEig4TNyvzjio95eBFGreAmgkGQJSPqZV9HUl&id=61558717479769; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/07/26/na-pivdennomu-napryamku-zafiksuvaly-prolit-ponad-320-rozviduvalnyh-droniv-protyvnyka/

[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13083

[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/16957

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/16957

[69] https://www.facebook.com/npcukrenergo/posts/pfbid034BdhVZZEYXxfL3ATTMwdFNuL783sGcu2eLrRDvuBVmViWS3kjoexj1sRLSkA3gyZl?ref=embed_post

[70] https://suspilne dot media/799013-zelenskij-obicae-novi-dani-sodo-vbivstva-farion-u-nato-pidtverdili-padinna-v-rumunii-drona-rf-883-den-vijni-onlajn/

[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/41409 ; https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid02PAFfS32zFK9HiV9gu4CAyWw9GqCDnTRAxrJwBTLhk8xyBg9enTYqsPu78iTkACbql

[72] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-cyber-campaign-shifts-ukraines-frontlines

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/41413

[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/41393

[75] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2024

[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/41405

[77] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1460

[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2024

[79] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/finance/articles/2024/07/26/1052157-kitaiskie-banki-otkazivayutsya-prinimat-gryaznie-yuani-iz-rossii

[80] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011624

[81] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/07/22/v-rossii-sozdali-miniatyurnyy-podavitel-dronov-karman/ ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/22/miniatiurnyj-podavitel-dronov-karman-sozdali-v-rossii.html ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/07/22/23509033.shtml

[82] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/07/22/v-rossii-sozdali-miniatyurnyy-podavitel-dronov-karman/ ; https://rg dot ru/2024/07/22/miniatiurnyj-podavitel-dronov-karman-sozdali-v-rossii.html ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/07/22/23509033.shtml

[83] https://iz dot ru/1732631/2024-07-25/v-rossii-nachalos-seriinoe-proizvodstvo-geksakoptera-mis-35

[84] https://iz dot ru/1732631/2024-07-25/v-rossii-nachalos-seriinoe-proizvodstvo-geksakoptera-mis-35

[85] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74634

[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/3652

[87] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/20285

[88] https://t.me/tass_agency/262661; https://t.me/pul_1/13151 ; https://t.me/pul_1/13152

Q&A: Ukraine’s Haidai on the battle for Severodonetsk, Lysychansk

Luhansk governor says his troops will hold on to Lysychansk for ‘as long as possible’ so the Ukrainian army can shore up defences in the neighbouring Donetsk region.

Russian forces have taken control of the eastern Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk, in Ukraine’s Luhansk region, delivering a significant victory for President Vladimir Putin, four months after he ordered his troops into Ukraine.

The fall of Severodonetsk on Saturday came after the strategic city – with a pre-war population of 100,000 – endured weeks of heavy bombardment. The battle culminated with a Ukrainian decision to retreat after street-by-street fighting in the city’s industrial zone, where Ukrainian fighters had held out for weeks in the Azot chemical plant together with hundreds of civilians.

The governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, told Al Jazeera on Sunday that Ukrainian troops decided to withdraw from Severodonetsk because “all the defensive structures had been shelled so much and destroyed”.

“We would have simply lost many soldiers,” he said. “We withdrew well and in an organised fashion and without losing even one fighter.”

Now the battle has moved from Severodonetsk to its twin city of Lysychansk, across the Seversky-Donets River, the only town in Luhansk still in Ukrainian hands.

If Russia were to take Lysychansk, it would control the whole of Luhansk, which together with the Donetsk region makes up what is collectively known as the Donbas.

“We will hold [Lysychansk] for as long as possible,” said Haidai. “If there aren’t any big losses, we will hold it.”

He added that the Russians were unlikely to end the war even if they captured the entire Donbas region. “Only force can stop Putin,” he said.

Al Jazeera spoke with Haidai about the battle for Severodonetsk and the situation in Lysychansk. The conversation below has been edited lightly for length and clarity.

Al Jazeera: The situation in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk remains tense. Can you tell us what has happened there over the last day? Serhiy Haidai: There are very serious attacks from the Russian army on the town of Lysychansk. The attacks are coming from different sides. The town is stretched out geographically, with rises, slopes, descents; there is an [industrial zone], there are high-rise buildings – this is not Severodonetsk which is a neat square of four kilo meters by four kilometers (2.5 miles by 2.5 miles).

There’s a huge amount of weapons dropped onto people. Just today, in one day, the town has been shelled more than 150 times. It is just a catastrophe. Right now in Lysychansk, the Russian army is trying to break through the line of defence or to cut it off at Seversky [Seversky-Donets River] to encircle Lysychansk.

Al Jazeera: What about Severodonetsk? When was it taken? Haidai: A decision was made to pull out our troops because, over several months, all the defensive structures had been shelled so much and destroyed that there was no point in holding on in one place. We would have simply lost many soldiers. So we withdrew, we withdrew well and in an organised fashion and without losing even one fighter.

Al Jazeera: How many people are left in Severodonetsk and are you worried about them? Haidai: More than 10,000.

The town isn’t being shelled now because it was the Russian army doing the shelling. Our forces don’t shell locals. Why would we shell our own people? So I’m not worried in the sense that people are subject to danger. But the amount of shelling was huge so it’s likely that some mines that haven’t exploded are still there and that could be a big problem.

Al Jazeera: But they are in Russian hands. Are you worried about that? Haidai: Of course, I’m worried about every person who has been left surrounded and under occupation, but for three months we were asking them to evacuate. I myself was doing this from every platform that was possible, and we did evacuate many people.

The ones left are mostly those who wanted to stay.

Al Jazeera: Why do you think they didn’t want to leave? Haidai: Some just didn’t want to lose everything they had, their apartment or house, and some because there was nowhere to go and they were afraid – mostly elderly people who said: “We were born here, we will die here.” And there was some percentage who were waiting for the Russians.

Al Jazeera: Is it hard to believe that some people want the Russians there? Haidai: These are exactly the people who have no motivation, who haven’t seen much in this life. They weren’t earning even the average salary so they could go to Europe and see the world. They are not motivated to grow – they are content with the concept of the Soviet Union and the legacy of it in Russia.

Al Jazeera: Many say the battle in Severodonetsk was similar to Mariupol – that soldiers sheltering in the Azot plant was like Azovstal. But you’ve said that it’s not the same. Why? Haidai: The size is different. Mariupol is a huge city, Azovstal is a huge industrial complex and there is a whole underground city-bomb shelter. There is no such thing at Azot. There are a few separate places of shelter.

Secondly, Mariupol was surrounded but Severodonetsk wasn’t, so there was always a way for us to get products and supplies there.

Al Jazeera: Have all the troops that were in Severodonetsk now been moved to Lysychansk? Haidai: Yes

Al Jazeera: And you think you will hold Lysychansk? Haidai: We will hold it for as long as possible. If there aren’t any big losses, we will hold it. While we were holding the Russian army back in Luhansk, the Donetsk Oblast was digging in very well and was building strong defences.

Al Jazeera: The Russian army has more weapons, manpower. Why do you think it took them so long to capture Severodonetsk? Haidai: Because they don’t know how to fight. When was the last time they fought against a strong opponent? Let’s remember. Even in Chechnya, they lost the first campaign. They just destroy everything and that’s it. That’s their tactic.

Al Jazeera: You said a few days ago that some forces were being withdrawn from Lysychansk as well. Do you think Russia can take all of Luhansk? Haidai: It can. Unfortunately, it can.

Al Jazeera: If they take all of Luhansk, and all of the Donbas. Do you think it will stop the war? Haidai: I don’t think so. Only force can stop Putin.

Al Jazeera: And you will try to get the territory back? Haidai: Yes, undoubtedly.

Al Jazeera: You see so much tragedy, so many people dying every day. How do you cope? Haidai: Well there are a lot of people looking up to me. So at the moment, I can’t show my emotions. They are there, but they are very very deeply buried.

Al Jazeera: This is your home, these are your cities. When you see the destruction, how does it make you feel? Haidai: Look, in two and half years, we have restored a lot in the Luhansk region, more than in the ten years before. So seeing all this is painful but I know we will restore it all again.

Al Jazeera: Were there any casualties in Lysychansk today? Haidai: Yes, but we can’t even count how many because there is a huge amount of shelling.

Al Jazeera: Why do you think Russia is doing this? Haidai: The country is the richest, with huge resources but they don’t even have a normal, decent car of their own. So they can’t make anything. And the only way they can justify this is to show that the whole world is against them, everyone is aggressive towards them and so they have to find some kind of enemy.