baltic 56 yacht

The Baltic 56 is based on and developed by the design and construction concept first used on the Baltic 50 and 79. For this new fast cruising craft inspired by modern ocean cruisers and able to combine ultra modern designs and hydrodynamics with medium and not extreme displacement, for cruising use with variable loads.

In fact, the Baltic 56 is a craft intended for sports and cruising with no limits concerning navigation length and it is suitable above all for family use, which means it has all the conveniences and great autonomy plus a design that makes safe maneuvers easy, with a smaller crew in all sea and wind conditions. The hull is in composite sandwich material with glass fibers, laminated with epoxy and with carbon anti-collision reinforcements. The deck is made entirely in carbon and divided into two cockpits to create a guest area that is independent of the rig area.

Specifications

Characteristics.

The rig is all concealed below deck as well as being extremely simplified so that with the aid of electric winches it can be managed by just two people. Cruising requirements mean that a mobile keel has been fitted to reduce draft and make it easier to approach the shore or to moor in port. The resulting keel range also has the benefit of making it possible to lighten the bulb while still increasing stability and therefore cruise comfort.

When it comes to style, many of the design features have been taken from Baltic 79 Vismara / Vrolijk. In fact what stands out of both is their “family style”, the bundle of functional –aesthetic solutions that invite extended use of the boat and all of the areas on board, inside and out, during navigation, while moored and even in port. The Baltic 56 has a short deckhouse with glazed front and slightly raised lounge for viewing the exterior. The master cabin has been placed in the bow for greater silence when the boat is moored; there is a big storage space for the dinghy in the stern garage in the event of fast journey, and the anchor is maneuvered easily thanks to a concealed system in the bow which uses a pneumatic piston. The interiors enhance the high level of Baltic’s traditional woodwork.

Runaway Bunny 

Runaway Bunny is hull number 3 of 6 Baltic 56’s built by the legendary Finnish yard as a semi-custom project to judel/vrolijk & co designs and using the very finest carbon construction techniques. She was conceived specifically for fast and safe offshore sailing, hence her extremely practical interior, and twin-cockpit, twin-companionway exterior configurations. Her powerful sloop rig is very easily handled by a short-handed crew thanks to numerous powered winches and the ability to set the German mainsheet system on both dedicated 3-speed electric winches simultaneously to both allow fast and slow sheeting at the push of a button. This logical simplicity extends to the electric main halyard winch and removable genoa furling drum which allows easy and fast conversion from racing to full cruising modes.

Boat Overview:

Model: Baltic 56 - 003

Length: 56 ft

Beam: 14.7 ft

Draft: 10.5 ft

Displacement: 33,730lbs

Fuel: 565 liter fuel capacity in 315 & 250 liter tanks

Water: 800 liters

Engine: YANMAR 4JH3-THE 100hp 4-cylinder turbo diesel engine

Cabins: 3 cabins 

Boat Equipment:

Cockpit table

Cockpit shower

Cockpit cushions

Electric anchor windlass

Dinghy outboard engine

Bimini and dodger

Roller furling main

Roller furling genoa

Electronics :

Speedometer

Depth sounder

Radio CD Player

Cockpit speakers

Outlet 12 V plug

fridge and freezer  

What's Included in your charter:

Linens and towels

Fully equipped galley

Water heater

Propane grill

Navigation charts and manual navigation tools

First aid kit, life preservers and emergency equipment

Starter kit: Dish soap, toilet paper, 1 roll paper towels, trash bags, 409, spice kit

Yachting World

• Digital Edition

Baltic 67 review: Finnish superyacht yard goes back to its roots with no-compromise cruiser

• Toby Hodges
• March 28, 2019

When a renowned superyacht yard builds a 67-footer for short-handed cruising you can be sure the result will be something special

Were money no object and you wanted the ultimate yacht for long-term cruising, what would you choose? How large could you go without needing a paid crew? What do you really need length and space for and how important is displacement and potential speed to you?

These were the sort of questions crowding into my head on first viewing the sensational new Baltic 67 at the Cannes Yachting Festival . It is truly striking. The quality of the yacht is undeniably world class, but it’s the precision of design and engineering that soon absorbs you.

The owner of this first boat is a highly experienced cruising sailor, boat owner and navigator, so joining him for a 24-hour trial from Mallorca proved the ideal way to get under the gleaming composite skin of this athletic new model.

The concept is about combining the pleasure of pure sailing with ease of handling for long-distance cruising at high average speeds. It is the alternative to a full custom yacht – all the engineering is already calculated – but a great deal of flexibility has been worked into the design, with options including single or twin rudders, a fixed or telescopic keel, multiple cabin layouts, and a carbon or epoxy sandwich hull.

Wanting to return to its mid-size fast cruiser roots, Baltic Yachts teamed up with designers and fellow in-demand superyacht specialists Judel Vrolijk and Design Unlimited. The result is this exceedingly attractive, modern-looking sloop, with a powerful hull shape, a flush foredeck and a low-profile coachroof.

Powered sail handling systems means Manyeleti can be sailed by just two

The Baltic 67 is very much at the luxury and custom end of the production yacht scale, so our light wind trial of the boat focused more on the various choices and details aboard and how they might be relevant to sailors in general. Hull number one in particular had a lot of owner input.

Manyeleti , the first 67, belongs to Erik Lindgren. It is his fifth yacht from Baltic after a string of upgrades that started with a used 39 in 1989. “It’s very different to design and build your own boat – in my case using nearly 30 years of offshore sailing experience,” Lindgren explains.

Swede Lindgren travelled to the yard once a month and was in daily contact with the project manager, Kjell Vesto.

The Lindgrens’ plan is to head off on another world cruise in a couple of years time, when Erik’s teenage children have finished school. His shakedown sail involved a 5,000-mile trip from Finland to and around the Mediterranean.

“Not a single thing broke,” he reports, saluting Baltic’s build quality. “I could literally go to El Corte Inglés, stock up, fuel up and sail across the Atlantic.”

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Walk the course with Mike Broughton- navigator onboard the brand new Baltic 115 Nikata

Start date:  Monday 22nd February 2016 Course: Approx. 600nm non-stop around 11 Caribbean Islands Organised by: The Royal Ocean Racing…

The Baltic 67 is as big as you can go without needing a pro crew, argues Erik Lindgren.  “I’ve spent a lot of time on World ARC boats… it’s the details that make living on board easier. This is a technical boat, but is less dependent on systems than our old Baltic 56. On the other hand it’s great to have aircon and a lifting keel.

“Half the time spent aboard will be for long distance stuff and holidays for the two of us, but a lot of the time will be spent with friends and family too.”

Privacy at this size is a big benefit. “I have no need to have a big boat for show,” says Lindgren, “but I wanted to have the things I need.”

The retractable arm for the anchor roller is an engineering masterpiece. It rises from the anchor locker at the touch of a button

The most important features he wanted, which help explain the jump in size from his previous 56, were a furling boom, a large, practical galley, four cabins and a tender garage large enough to house a forward-facing dinghy. While his yachts have grown and become more complex, Lindgren maintains that the methodical way Baltic builds boats results in a lot fewer problems.

A carbon furling boom is an eye-watering investment, but it does make the hoisting, reefing and lowering of sails a quick and largely hassle-free procedure. It can make the difference to whether you go sailing or not. Within minutes of leaving Palma’s breakwaters, we had main and jib unfurled and were matching the 8 knot wind speeds.

Manyeleti is hull number one in the Baltic 67 series

Easy performance

The Hall carbon boom uses an electric mandrel motor that is synchronised with the halyard to avoid too much sail spilling out during a hoist. The traveller is also electric, while the sheet car pullers, backstay, vang and furlers are hydraulically-operated. The result is the ease of push-button sailing typically used on modern performance superyachts.

We spent the first few hours reaching across Palma Bay. Despite having 24 hours aboard, the most breeze we found was 11 knots, which translated to 9.5 knots boatspeed – very respectable under white sails only (fully battened main and non-overlapping jib). The majority of the time was spent close-hauled, matching the single-figure wind, even exceeding it when it dropped below 6 knots.

Neat details: the forward end of the jib car puller, which is hydraulically powered

I found myself gravitating to the side deck to sit and steer, instinctively wanting to sail the Baltic 67 like a cruiser-racer. There are good views over the low coachroof and flush foredeck, but nothing except freeboard height to prevent a wet backside if the decks ship green water.

The helmsman can also sit forward of the wheel and reach the two winches. I like the way the primary is mounted inboard, though the positioning of the turning block for the jib sheet creates an obstacle on the side deck. Baltic reasons that it helps provide the option to use either winch for the sheet.

Speed for oceans

A flying sail would have helped to get the most out of the conditions, but Lindgren was still awaiting delivery of a Code 0 and A3, both on top-down furlers. However, even when the evening breeze died to around 4-5 knots, the Baltic 67 still provided an enjoyable experience on the helm. It’s rare that you can say such a thing while only using main and jib.

The 67 is designed for potent offwind performance, to limit engine use on transocean voyages. The aggressive sail area to displacement ratio of 30.9 is possibly taking things too far: the boat has so much power to weight that it will need to be treated as a real performance cruiser and tamed accordingly (i.e. reefed early). But what our trial sail did show was how well the Baltic 67 fulfils its brief of being able to offer enjoyable sailing in light wind.

“Bluewater boats don’t usually sail in 10-15 knots downwind – and we had a lot of that,” Lindgren points out, with reference to their previous Pacific crossing. “At 150º true, this boat is sailing at 8-9 knots, which is a big difference. As long as you are over 8 knots you are properly moving through the water,” he reasons. “Below that you’re in the swell and not in control.”

The twin pedestals are well designed to site plotter screens and remote controls for powered deck functions and sail handling

With the relatively low coachroof and cockpit backrests and aft positioning of the helms, protection from the elements may be a concern. When you look at Baltic’s large new designs in build, the 142 and 146, both have lengthy deckhouses that provide plenty of protection. But it chose the more in-vogue deck design for this semi-custom size, so its solutions for cockpit protection depend largely on a retractable sprayhood and bimini. These can remain in place while sailing and have already been tested in up to 40 knots.

The cockpit area on this first Baltic 67 has been adapted according to the owners’ wishes, including a narrower space between benches and no fixed table. The Lindgrens like to be able to brace feet between benches and to be able to sleep on the sole between them when offshore. The table and carbon legs stow beneath the central saloon soleboards.

We anchored at dusk at Es Trenc beach, 25 miles to the south-east of Palma, in water so clear we could pick the spot to drop the hook between weed patches. The ability to anchor in less than 4m amply demonstrated the appeal of a lifting keel. The keel system, from the highly reputable Italian brand APM, raises the T-keel hydraulically up to 2.5m.

The anchor arrangement is another fine piece of engineering: the arm is concealed in a shallow locker and rotates over and into place at the push of a button. The roller then extends out to keep it clear of the stem. The second Baltic 67 will have a fixed roller incorporated into the bowsprit.

The furling jib and powered padeye are recessed neatly

Open transom choice

The garage houses a 3.2m dinghy stowed longitudinally, with the engine mounted, between the dual rudders. Lindgren chose an AB tender with aluminium hull (53kg). It has a 20hp outboard so can plane with four adults yet is light enough to be dragged up the beach. He also opted for an open transom that, although an unconventional choice for ocean cruising, gives easy access to the swim platform and dinghy.

There is copious stowage space throughout the Baltic 67. In addition to the tall sail locker in the forepeak, the aft quarter lockers easily swallow electric bikes, inflatable paddleboards, snorkel gear, waterskis, spare fuel and a liferaft valise. Here there’s also access to the steering gear with independent autopilots used on both quadrants.

I particularly like the way multiple Antal T-lock fittings are flush-mounted along the toerail and in the cockpit. These enable quick and easy swivelling toggles to be inserted for loops and blocks, or for harness attachments.

Weight versus noise

The following morning was windless, leaving us with a three-hour motor back to Palma. The 150hp six-cylinder Steyr was specified for its low noise and emissions, and drives a four-blade Bruntons prop via a standard shaft.

E-glass was chosen over the standard carbon hull. Lindgren’s previous Baltic 56 was carbon and he wanted the better noise insulation over the weight difference (up to one tonne). The 67 is a very quiet, relaxing boat under motor, with no need to raise voices under power.

The spacious saloon has enough room for both dining and coffee tables

Down below the Baltic is an aircon-cooled haven of charm and exquisite quality. The more time I spent aboard and the more I learned of the systems and engineering, the more I began to appreciate what sets this boat apart.

The Design Unlimited styling is elegant and tasteful, with a mahogany finish on this first boat. With four different layout configurations plenty of scope is allowed for owner customisation. But behind the scenes is what you really pay for with the Baltic. It’s the telling result of what happens when a yard goes down in model size – this 67 is built like a superyacht.

For example, the engine room, used for hot items like engine, genset and water-heater, links through to a proper mechanical/utility room abaft the galley, where equipment is mounted on three walls for easy access (including chargers, inverters, pumps, watermaker and compressors).

“The thinking is that everything should be in reach and that you should be able to maintain it easily,” says Lindgren, pointing to the Spectra watermaker (his fourth) mounted on one bulkhead.

The boat’s systems are beautifully laid out for ease of inspection and maintenance

Stowage throughout has been brilliantly conceived. The 2,000lt of water and diesel tanks, plus the batteries, are all mounted centrally, under the saloon, leaving cavernous practical stowage under the berths. Custom-made fabric bags are used under the saloon seats to maximise useable volume.

Lifting the carbon sandwich soleboards at the base of the companionway reveals the sea chests and main manifolds for fuel and water, a prime example of the meticulous and practical systems layout. The 1,440Ah of lithium gel batteries further forward have a reservoir surrounding them, which can cool the cells if necessary without flooding them. And there are custom-made drip trays below any filters to prevent mess or corrosion.

The keel uses a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) to activate the hydraulics, the cylinders for which can be replaced from within the boat. All other electrics are on manual relays. The fuse locker is a work of art and opens out for full access to the wiring, with every wire and fuse numbered and labelled.

Smart cabin choice

Manyeleti ’s owner’s cabin, with adjoining heads and shower in the forwardmost section, has an offset double berth positioned aft by the main bulkhead, a relatively central area of the boat to sleep. However, on passage, Lindgren says he sleeps on deck, or in the single cabin amidships. There are also leecloths on the saloon berths, a comfortable option if guests don’t want to share the twins.

The owner’s cabin is (purposefully) the only one aboard Manyeleti to feature a double bed

There is a good reason why there is only one double bed. Lindgren often sails with male friends, hence twin and single berths are a pragmatic choice. The use of a split heads and shower shared between the twin and single cabins is also sensible.

The central section of the interior is superb, with a traditional lower saloon, a navstation beside the companionway and a formidable U-shaped galley. It was important to the Lindgrens that the galley was large enough for two to work in yet still be seamanlike. The result is a very practical area with superb chilled, dried goods and crockery stowage. Ventilation ducts keep it nice and cool, though personally I’d want to have a hatch through to the cockpit.

Lindgren swears by the dishwasher, reasoning that it uses less water than washing up and helps keep the galley tidy. This and an induction cooker would be sensible options if you had sufficient power, and would avoid the need for gas.

The exemplary finish and smaller details help furnish the boat with a top quality feel. From the hinges, light switches and showerheads to the gas sprung hatches and overall joiner work, the Baltic 67 oozes quality.

The Baltic 67 has been designed with short-handed sailing in mind

Baltic 67: the verdict

Baltic has spent the last decade building some of the finest performance superyachts. You don’t receive commissions for yachts such as Hetairos , Pink Gin VI , or My Song without a top reputation, and to get that sort of quality on a 67-footer is truly special. Attention to detail and class of engineering and finish are hallmarks of this new model.

The Baltic 67 has the performance in light airs to match her on-trend looks and is a joy to helm. The choice of a comparatively unprotected cockpit and an open transom may not sit well with conventional bluewater sailors, but times are changing and this design is aimed as much at port-hopping from Portofino as at Pacific passagemaking . It is the solutions, stowage and systems employed throughout that help make it a valid option for distance cruising.

The Baltic 67 has the legs to outrun virtually any other cruising monohull and to keep sailing fast in light apparent winds. To know you’re buying the best in terms of design and composite build – and created by the same team involved in a yacht that costs tens of millions – must help compensate for the significant initial outlay. For the rest of us, we can but dream.

Specification

LOA: 20.52m (67ft 4in)

LWL: 19.20m (62ft 12in)

Beam (max): 5.45m (17ft 11in)

Draught (max): 3.90m (12ft 10in)

Draught (telescopic): 2.50m (8ft 2in)

Displacement (lightship): 24,400kg (53,792lb)

Ballast: 9,000kg (19,841lb)

Sail Area: 255.6m2 (2,751ft2)

Berths: 7-8

Engine: 150hp

Water: 1,000lt (220gal)

Fuel: 900lt (198gal)

Sail Area/disp ratio: 30.9

Disp/LWL ratio: 96

Price: €3.95 million (ex. VAT)

Design: Judel/Vrolijk & Co and Design Unlimited

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2005 Baltic Yachts 56 – NOW SOLD

Posted Thursday 11th February 2021

Grabau International is delighted to announce the sale of the 2005 Baltic Yachts 56 ‘BIONIC ELK’.

The one and only BIONIC ELK. Perhaps the most striking of the modern generation of Baltic Yachts. Built regardless of cost and arguably the speed machine of all. Lots of recent refit expenditure leaves her in sparkling shape and ready for her next owner. A great opportunity to acquire an icon of modern yachting.

FURTHER BROKER’S COMMENTS:

Quite simply, the ultimate performance cruiser. Baltic Yachts legendary build quality in Epoxy sandwich with carbon and Kevlar, ultra-slippery Judel Vrolijk hull lines, easily-operated and very well-hidden canting keel and daggerboard systems, easily-managed rig set-up for short-handed sailing, and a fantastic modern interior layout with three cabins, two heads plus further occasional berths in saloon and pilot-berths aft. Her specification highlights include:- • Teak decks • Retractable bowthruster • 24vDC domestic systems with Gel batteries • Mastervolt Generator • Spectra Watermaker • CLD Air-Conditioning • Canting keel with daggerboards • Carbon rig with Park Avenue boom • Carbon laminate sails plus gennakers and Code 0. • Lewmar 3-speed electric winches close to helm for sail controls • Gaggenau galley • B&G instruments with radar, plotters and H5000 nav instruments

Originally launched in 2005 and the first in the Baltic 56 semi-custom series, BIONIC ELK is by far the most unique and performance orientated of her class. Simply perfect for inshore racing, she also has great ocean-legs as proved by an ARC-crossing in her early life.

Extensively updated throughout her life, her most recent refit took place in 2017 with Baltic Yachts Service in Palma de Mallorca, shortly before her purchase by her current owners. Highlights from this refit included:- • Complete new B&G electronics system with 3x Zeus 12” plotters, full H5000 system and mast-mounted 30/30 displays • Rig taken out, mast and boom clear-coated and replaced rod standing rigging • Replacement upgraded Yanmar saildrive gearbox • New suit of North 3Di sails • Repainting of superstructure • New exterior canvas work • New interior covers, mattresses and cushions • New Gel service batteries • Overhaul of all systems, seacocks, keel box etc (carried out later in La Coruna) • Servicing of engine and gearbox

BUILDER’S COMMENTS:

Baltic 56 no 1 hull “BIONIC ELK” is certainly a full out example of maximum flexibility. The deck and interior layouts are 100% custom, tailor designed and styled by Judel/Vrolijk to suit the clients’ wishes. The technology level is extremely high utilizing pre-preg carbon laminates, foam sandwich in the hull with honeycomb sandwich in the deck laminates and in general the technology is taken to the highest level.

The boat is furthermore equipped with a canting keel system allowing the keel to swing 40 degrees to each side boosting the sailing stability without making the boat heavy. On our previous canting keel 78-footer Super Baltic 5, we used a canard forward, but this time the 56 no.1 had twin dagger boards. The dagger boards are more effective since they are further back hence lessening the up and down movement, they are designed with asymmetric foil shape giving better lift drag ratios and additionally they are closer to vertical when sailing also making them more effective.

We wish her new owners fair winds and following seas.

For those that missed out, Grabau International has a number of other similar yachts available for sale including:

Baltic yachts 60 custom – full details here.

Starkel Star 60 – full details here

Grand Soleil 56 – full details here

Vismara V50 Mills – full details here

Baltic Yachts 50 – full details here

X-Yachts X-50 – full details here

Do you have a yacht like this to sell? Grabau International are always looking for new high quality cruising yacht listings both in the UK and internationally. For further information about our tailored brokerage services, please  look here  or feel free to  contact us

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BALTIC YACHTS LIGHTER, STIFFER, FASTER, GREENER – TOGETHER

Baltic Yachts is the world’s leading builder of advanced composite yachts. Our highly skilled workforce uses leading edge marine technology and traditional craftsmanship to create award-winning yachts. Each yacht is unique, unmatched in its quality, unmatched in its performance.

Through our deep understanding of advanced composite materials like carbon fibre, we build luxury yachts, which are lighter, stiffer and faster than the competition. Controlling weight, maximising performance and using a rigid, precision-engineered structure provide the platform for the best possible sailing experience.

OUR UNIQUE YACHTS

Baltic Yachts has built an impressive and highly respected reputation for building a new breed of multi-role yachts performing to the highest standards both as luxury cruisers and successful racing yachts competing on the global superyacht regatta circuit.

Combining the latest carbon fibre engineering with top build quality from our skilled Finnish workforce, yachts like the Baltic 115 Nikata, the Baltic 130 My Song and the Baltic 175 Pink Gin are prize winning examples of how performance and luxury accommodation can be successfully combined in a modern yacht.

PASSION FOR INNOVATION

Our engineers, designers and craftsmen are constantly developing ideas and team up with external experts in their fields to turn what at first might seem an impossible dream into reality. Whether custom or semi-custom built, each yacht displays features reflecting the forward-thinking nature of our clients.

We pride ourselves in our innovative thinking and design to make our yachts easier, safer and more efficient. Whether it’s a performance-enhancing DSS foil, a retractable propeller or finger-light responsive steering, Baltic Yachts can deliver.

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We’re constantly updating our website to bring you news of launchings, new commissions and Baltic inspired innovation.

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2023

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 24, 2023, 7:30pm ET  

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on November 24, and covers both November 23 and November 24 due to the fact that ISW did not publish a Campaign Assessment on November 23 in observance of the Thanksgiving Day holiday. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.  Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi reported on November 23 that Russian forces launched a “third wave” of assaults as part of the Russia offensive operation in the Avdiivka direction, and Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that this “third wave” began on November 22.[1] Shtupun reported a 25 to 30 percent increase in Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka on November 22 and stated that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian columns of roughly a dozen armored vehicles in total during assaults.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled at least 50 Russian assaults in the Avdiivka direction on November 23 and 24.[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations on Avdiivka’s northern and southern flanks but did not characterize any Russian assaults as heavily mechanized.[4] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to advance north of Avdiivka and made further gains in the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka but did not make any territorial claims consistent with a successful renewed large-scale Russian offensive push.[5]

Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian tanks and seven armored fighting vehicles on November 22, suggesting that Russian forces are currently conducting a smaller set of mechanized assaults than in October.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces lost 50 tanks and 100 armored vehicles in renewed assaults on Avdiivka on October 19 and 15 tanks and 33 armored vehicles during the initial large, mechanized assaults on October 10.[7] Russian forces have lost a confirmed 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles in offensive operations near Avdiivka since October 9, and the Russian military appeared to spend the end of October and all of November preparing for a wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults to compensate for these heavy-equipment losses.[8] Large infantry-led ground assaults will likely pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces defending in the Avdiivka direction but will not lead to a rapid Russian advance in the area.

High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.  BBC Panorama  and Russian opposition outlet  Vazhnye Istorii  published investigations on November 23 detailing how Just Russia Party leader Sergei Mironov adopted a 10-month-old Ukrainian girl whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from a Kherson City orphanage in autumn of 2022 alongside over 40 other children.[9] The investigations found that Mironov's new wife, Inna Varlamova, traveled to occupied Kherson Oblast, where occupation authorities issued her a power of attorney to deport two children—a 10-month-old girl and a two-year-old boy.[10] Both  BBC  and  Vazhnye Istorii  noted that Varlamova falsely introduced herself to the leadership of the children's home as the "head of children's affairs from Moscow," a position which she does not hold and that still would not legitimize the deportations of the children under international law.[11] Russian court documents show that Mironov and Varlamova then adopted the girl in November 2022, changed her name from her Ukrainian birth name to a new Russian name and the surname Mironova, and officially changed her place of birth from Kherson City to Podolsk, Russia.[12] Neither investigation could confirm the whereabouts of the two-year-old boy. Mironov notably responded to the investigation and called it a "fake from Ukrainian special services and their Western curators" meant to discredit him.[13]

Mironov and his wife, who reportedly holds a low-level unspecified position in the Russian Duma, follow in the footsteps of Russian Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who has also adopted at least one Ukrainian child from occupied Mariupol.[14] While ISW can only confirm that these two Russian officials have forcibly adopted deported Ukrainian children at this time, the adoptions may be indicative of a wider pattern in which Russian officials adopt deported children in order to legitimize the practice in the eyes of the Russian public. Russian politicians may be adopting deported Ukrainian children to set administrative and cultural precedents for wider adoptions of Ukrainian children to further escalate Russia's campaign to deport Ukrainians to Russia. ISW continues to assess that the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children likely amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[15]

Ukraine’s Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Germany and France will lead a coalition of 20 countries to further develop Ukraine’s air defenses, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov added that the coalition will help Ukraine further develop its ground-based air defense systems.[16] Zelensky noted on November 23 that improved Ukrainian air defenses will save lives and resources, allow Ukrainian citizens to return from abroad, and deprive Russia of the ability to terrorize Ukraine.[17] Ramstein Group members also agreed on issues such as additional equipment and weapons for Ukraine during the winter of 2023–24, mine trawling and other security measures in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s NATO Interoperability Roadmap, and additional security assistance packages from the US, Germany, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.  Putin attended the session alongside Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and the CSTO’s Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov.[19] The summit marked the end of Belarus’ chairmanship of the CSTO, and Lukashenko stated that Kazakhstan will hold the chairmanship beginning December 31, 2023. Putin thanked the session’s attendees for contributing to the regional defense structure and highlighted expanding military-technical cooperation between CSTO member states. Putin stated during his bilateral meeting with Rahmon that Russia will deliver two air defense battalions equipped with S-300 air defense systems to Tajikistan as part of the CSTO’s unified air defense system.[20] [Correction Note: The previous sentence incorrectly referenced two air defense divisions equipped with S-300s. It has been corrected to read two air defense "battalions."]

Russian sources widely noted Armenia’s absence from the CSTO summit on November 23.[21] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also did not attend the CSTO’s summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on October 13 after Armenian forces refrained from participating in the CSTO “Indestructible Brotherhood-2023" exercises in early October.[22] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on November 23 that the Kremlin regretted Armenia’s absence in Minsk but stated that Armenia remains “an ally and strategic partner” to Russia.[23] The Kremlin has previously attempted to dispel concerns about the deterioration of Russian-Armenian relations.[24] Kremlin newswire  TASS  reported that Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan reiterated that Armenia is not considering leaving the CSTO or asking Russia to withdraw its forces from Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia.[25]

Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.  The  Washington Post  reported on November 24 that it corroborated information in emails provided by Ukrainian intelligence services that detail the formation of a Russian-Chinese business consortium that aims to build an underwater tunnel along the Kerch Strait connecting Russia to occupied Crimea.[26] Vladimir Kalyuzhny, identified by the emails as the general director of the consortium, reportedly messaged the Crimean occupation representative to the Russian President, Georgy Muradov, and stated that he has a letter from Chinese business partners attesting to the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation’s (CRCC) readiness to participate as a general contractor for the tunnel project.[27] The CRCC is under the supervision of China’s state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and is one of China’s largest construction firms.[28] The emails reportedly indicate that the CRCC stipulated that its involvement would occur through an unaffiliated legal entity and that an unnamed Chinese bank was willing to convert dollar funds into rubles to fund the consortium's projects.[29] Kalyuzhny, Crimean occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied the  Washington Post ’s reporting.[30] The reported Russian interest in the tunnel project, which would likely take years to complete, is an additional indicator of deep Russian concern about the vulnerability of ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Russia and occupied Crimea along the Kerch Strait Bridge.

European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.  The Finnish government announced on November 22 that Finland will close three more checkpoints on the Finnish-Russian border from November 23 to December 23, leaving only the northernmost checkpoint open.[31] Norwegian Prime Minister Johan Gahr Store stated on November 22 that Norway would also close its border to Russia “if necessary.“[32] Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated on November 23 that an increased number of migrants have also arrived at the Estonian-Russian border and that Russia is organizing the arrivals as part of an effort to “weaponize illegal immigration.”[33]  Reuters  reported on November 23 that the Estonian Interior Ministry stated   that Estonia has undertaken preparations to close its border crossings with Russia if “the migration pressure from Russia escalates.”[34] Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina stated on November 24 that Latvia has experienced a similar influx of migrants on its border with Russia, and Silina and Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated that these are Russian and Belarusian “hybrid attacks.”[35] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Finland on November 22 of “stirring up Russophobic sentiments” and interrupting border services that were an integral part of Russian–Finnish cooperation.[36] ISW previously assessed that Russia is employing a known hybrid warfare tactic similar to Russia’s and Belarus’s creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 that is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.[37]

The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance. [38] The RDS Congress issued a resolution on November 24 in which it claimed that unspecified actors are doing everything possible to preserve the existing system of power in Russia regardless of the political situation or Russian citizens’ will.[39] The RDS Congressional resolution issued a list of demands for Russian election reform and claimed that the RDS would not recognize any future elections as legitimate if the Russian government does not meet these demands.[40]

Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. [41] Russian sources reported on November 24 that Russian police and Rosgvardia raided a Wildberries (Russia’s largest online retailer) warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast looking for migrants who had recently acquired Russian citizenship.[42] Russian law enforcement reportedly took about 135 detained migrants with Russian citizenship and transferred them to military registration and enlistment offices.[43] An unspecified Russian law enforcement official told Russian news outlet  Interfax  that Russian law enforcement conducted the raid as part of “Operation Migrant,” which aims to ensure that all naturalized citizens are registered for military service and issue them military summonses.[44] A Russian source claimed that Russian law enforcement also conducted a raid near the Wildberries warehouse on November 23, fined 16 migrants for violating migration protocols, and deported three.[45] The Wildberries press service stated this mass detention of migrants interrupted company’s shipments and put billions of dollars at risk.[46]

The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.  The Russian Ministry of Digital Development proposed an initiative to create a unified platform for storing and processing footage from all video surveillance systems in Russia, which would reportedly cost 12 billion rubles (about $134 million).[47]  Kommersant  reported that there are about 1.2 million surveillance cameras in Russia, about half of which are currently accessible to the Russian government.[48] The Russian Ministry of Digital Development reportedly plans to increase the number of surveillance cameras across Russia to five million by 2030 and integrate all of them with facial and image recognition software.[49]  Kommersant  also noted that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations attempted a similar initiative in 2020 to 2022 as part of the Hardware and Software Complex “Safe City” project aimed at standardizing and installing surveillance systems with artificial intelligence software in Russian regions but faced criticism from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Russian Ministry of Economy.[50]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces began a renewed offensive effort towards Avdiivka on November 22, although likely with weaker mechanized capabilities than in the previous offensive waves that occurred in October.
• High-ranking Russian officials may be engaged in a wider scheme of forcibly adopting deported Ukrainian children.
• Ukraine’s Western allies declared their commitment to further develop Ukrainian air defense capabilities during the 17th Ramstein Group virtual meeting on November 22.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s (CSTO) Collective Security Council session in Minsk, Belarus on November 23 against the background of Armenia’s continued absence from recent CSTO events and exercises.
• Chinese businesses, including a prominent state-owned Chinese construction firm, are reportedly working with Russian businessmen to plan the construction of an underwater tunnel that would connect Russia with occupied Crimea.
• European states are responding to Russia's continued orchestration of an artificially created migrant crisis on its northwestern borders.
• The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) called prior Russian regional elections and the upcoming Russian presidential election illegitimate, likely in an effort to establish Girkin’s inevitable presidential election loss as a long-standing grievance.
• Russian law enforcement reportedly detained about 700 migrants at a warehouse in Moscow Oblast and issued some military summonses, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• The Kremlin is reportedly renewing attempts to control all video surveillance systems in Russia, likely as part of ongoing efforts to intensify its tools of digital authoritarianism to increase domestic repressions.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
• The Russian aviation industry is likely under significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 23 and 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction northeast of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (25km northwest of Svatove) but did not conduct any offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Petropavlivka.[52] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations from Orlyanka (22km east of Kupyansk) and near Petropavlivka.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that Russian forces are having widespread issues with electronic warfare (EW) systems along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, causing unnecessary casualties due to otherwise preventable drone strikes.[54] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 23 that Russian forces transferred an unspecified battalion of the Russian 380th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) from Kursk Oblast to positions near Raihorodka (12km west of Svatove).[55] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that the “Amura” detachment of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz are operating in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[56]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 23 and 24 and reportedly advanced on an unspecified date. The Ukrainian State Border Guards published footage on November 24 showing Ukrainian forces advancing and capturing Russian positions in an unspecified area of the Svatove direction on an unspecified date.[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and that fighting continues near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast  (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Bakhmut area near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on November 23.[60]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 22 and 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Klishchiivka.[61] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), the Berkhivka reservoir (about 2km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and the railway near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Bohdanivka, Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near the railway north of Klishchiivka and the heights west of the settlement, which a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to control as of November 23.[64] One Russian source claimed on November 23 that Klishchiivka is a contested “gray zone.”[65] Ukrainian military sources stated on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces in the Bakhmut direction are focusing on small tactical gains, probing the frontline, and conducting drone strikes at night.[66] A Ukrainian sergeant operating in the Bakhmut direction characterized fighting in his sector of the front on November 24 as "static, trench warfare."[67] The Russian MoD reported that elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Bakhmut direction.[68] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Corps) are also operating in the Bakhmut direction.[69]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Horlivka (20km south of Bakhmut) but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 23 or 24. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Mayorske (6km northwest of Horlivka).[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that there are meeting engagements near the waste heap northwest of Horlivka.[71]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Avdiivka southwest and west of Krasnohorivka (5km northeast of Avdiivka).[72]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka but did not make any confirmed gains on November 23 and 24. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka; near the railways north and northwest of Krasnohorivka; in and near the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka; near Novobakhmutivka (12km northwest of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (13km northeast of Avdiivka), Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka); and in the direction of Keramik (14km northwest of Avdiivka), Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka), and the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant south of Avdiivka.[73] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka, Novokalynove, Stepove, Krasnohorivka, and the coke plant; south and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), and Optyne (4km south of Avdiivka); and southeast of Avdiivka near the industrial zone.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 23 that Russian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force near Stepove, Vodyane, and Sieverne.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces advanced 150-200 meters in the direction of Novokalynove and Ocheretyne (15km northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[76] A Russian source claimed on November 22 that Russian forces control 80 percent of the industrial zone southeast of Avdiivka, and later claimed on November 24 that Russian forces control 95 percent of the area.[77] Another Russian source claimed on November 24 that Russian forces control the entire industrial zone but acknowledged that this claim is based on unconfirmed preliminary information.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Stepove but that Ukrainian forces still control a part of the settlement.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 23 and 24 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Novokalynove and Novobakhmutivka; north of Lastochkyne (5km west of Avdiivka); and near Stepove, Pervomaiske, Sieverne, Avdiivka.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 24 that Russian helicopters have to fly at very low altitudes to avoid Ukrainian air defense systems near Avdiivka.[81] Ukrainian Avdiivka Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash stated that Russian forces are struggling to use a large amount of military equipment due to weather conditions.[82]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 23 and 24.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 23 and 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[83] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Marinka but did not specify an outcome.[84]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis  (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 23 and 24 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults near and southwest of Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 23 and 24.[85] The Russian Vostok Battalion, which is operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, claimed on November 24 that Russian forces currently have an advantage in terms of fire power in this direction.[86] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces attacked near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka) on the evening of November 22 and throughout November 23, and northwest of Staromayorske on November 24.[87] Geolocated footage posted on November 23 shows elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) operating a Lancet drone against Ukrainian positions near Vesele (33km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[88]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and unsuccessful counterattacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 23 and 24. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and elsewhere in the overall southern Donetsk Oblast direction.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Ukrainian forces are trying to activate north of Pryytune and north of Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) but emphasized that Ukrainian forces are largely on the defensive on this sector of the front.[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows that Russian forces have marginally advanced southwest of Novopokrovka, about 9km northeast of Robotyne.[91] A Russian airborne (VDV) affiliated milblogger claimed on November 24 that elements of the 7th VDV Division, including the 108th Air Assault Regiment, recaptured positions north of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne and 5km south of Novopokrovka), which generally coincides with confirmation of Russian advances in the area southwest of Novopokrovka.[92] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to improve their positions near Robotyne on November 23 and conducted unsuccessful assaults near Robotyne, Novopokrovka, and west of Verbove on November 24.[93]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 23 and 24 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the westernmost trench in a series of three trenches that lie about 1km southwest of Robotyne, and other geolocated footage published on November 23 shows that Ukrainian forces have also made advances further west of the westernmost trench.[94] Additional geolocated footage posted on November 22 and 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced near the T0408 Orikhiv-Tokmak highway north of Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), between the outskirts of the aforementioned trench system and the northern outskirts of Novoprokopivka.[95] Russian milbloggers widely claimed on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces launched a renewed attack on Russian positions along the Robotyne-Verbove line with up to 100 personnel, five armored vehicles, and one Western-provided tank.[96] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne and Verbove on November 24, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction on November 23 and 24.[97]

Ukrainian forces continued combat operations on the (east) left bank of the Dnipro River on November 23 and 24, and both Ukrainian and Russian forces have made confirmed gains in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks on the forest area near Krynky on November 23, and then claimed on November 24 that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade (of the 40th Army Corps of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) counterattacked and knocked Ukrainian forces out of positions in the forest areas near Krynky.[98] Geolocated footage published on November 23 confirms that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have advanced within Krynky, suggesting that intense fighting is ongoing in the settlement and positions are frequently changing hands.[99] Russian sources claimed that elements of the 188th and 144th brigades are facing extremely poor conditions and a lack of resources while trying to defend the Krynky area.[100] Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[101]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a large-scale drone strike against occupied Crimea on the night of November 23 to 24. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a total of 13 drones in three waves from Kherson Oblast towards railway and military infrastructure in occupied Crimea.[102] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that this was one of the largest Ukrainian air attacks on occupied Crimea since the beginning of the war.[103] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defense shot down all 13 drones over Crimea, and that Black Sea Fleet naval aviation also hit 12 unmanned aerial boats traveling towards Crimea.[104]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts  (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian aviation industry is likely facing significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 23 that it obtained many documents from the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) detailing widespread issues within the Russian aviation industry.[105] The GUR reported that the documents show that there were 185 civil aviation accidents and 150 cases of technical malfunctions in the first nine months of 2023.[106] The GUR reported that the Russian aviation industry is transferring large portions of aircraft maintenance assets to Iran, where repairs occur without certification, due to a lack of repair capacity and specialists in Russia.[107] Russian aviation enterprises are reportedly increasingly using existing planes for component for new production.[108] The Russian United Aircraft Corporation announced on November 22 that it transferred a new batch of Su-34 frontline bombers manufactured at the Novosibirsk Aviation Plant to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[109] Widespread constraints on the civil aviation industry are likely also impacting defense aviation enterprises in Russia, but Russian officials are likely prioritizing military aviation production over the maintenance and production of civil aircraft.

Russian courts have reportedly considered over 4,000 criminal cases against Russian personnel for the unauthorized abandonment of their units since the start of partial mobilization. Russian opposition outlet  Mediazona  reported on November 24 that Russian courts considered 4,121 criminal cases for the unauthorized abandonment of a military unit and ruled in 3,740 cases as of November 21.[110]  Mediazona  reported that Russian courts have delivered sentences to roughly 100 Russian personnel a week on average since June 2023.[111]

Russian personnel from Russian federal subjects (regions) in Siberia and the Far East continue to represent a disproportionate number of Russian casualties in Ukraine. The  BBC  reported on November 24 that confirmed Russian military deaths per 10,000 males aged 16 to 61 in federal subjects of Russia show that the highest proportions of death happen in Siberian and Far Eastern regions.[112] The five highest proportions of military deaths occurred in the Tuva Republic (48.6 deaths), Republic of Buryatia (36.7 deaths), Nenets Autonomous Okrug (30 deaths), Altai Republic (26.5 deaths), and Transbaikal Krai (26.2 deaths).[113] St. Petersburg and Moscow have the lowest proportion of confirmed deaths with 2.5 and 1 per 10,000, respectively.[114]

Russian authorities continue to prevent the relatives of mobilized personnel from holding rallies calling for the demobilization of their relatives. Russian independent investigative outlet  Verstka  reported on November 23 that Russian authorities denied five applications for rallies by relatives of mobilized personnel in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk.[115] Russian opposition outlet  SOTA  reported that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin denied an appeal to his office’s decision to refuse permits for a rally in support of demobilization by citing COVID-19 public health restrictions.[116] Russian opposition outlet  Mobilization News  reported that officials in Novosibirsk Oblast accepted demands from relatives of mobilized personnel that would cap mobilization periods at a year with rotations no less than every three months.[117] ISW cannot confirm that any Russian officials have accepted conditions from relatives to set forth terms for mobilization.

Russian Technological Adaptations  (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec debuted its new “Chistyulya” portable anti-drone system on November 24.[118] The device reportedly weighs eight kilograms (about 18 pounds) and can suppress drones within a one-kilometer radius.[119] Russian opposition outlet  Vazhnye Istorii  ( iStories)  reported that Chinese online retail service AliExpress sells a similar product with almost the same specifications.[120]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas  (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian national and cultural identities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 23 that the Kremlin instructed occupation authorities to ensure that 70 percent of Ukrainian students in occupied areas participate in educational exchange programs in Russia.[121] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation schools have started efforts aimed at indoctrinating as early as first grade.[122] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Militia claimed on November 24 that 248 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast returned from a trip to Moscow City that the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer “Movement of the First” youth organization planned.[123] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on November 23 that over 60 students from occupied Donetsk Oblast are currently studying at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), an institute of higher education subordinate to the Russian Foreign Ministry.[124] Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko published footage on November 23 showing Russian military personnel teaching children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast basic military skills at an event in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[125]

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus  (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian military leadership reportedly hopes to increase the combat capabilities of Belarusian forces by equipping them with new drones and armored personnel carriers. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 24 that Belarus’ military leadership will equip Belarusian artillery brigades with Russian-produced “Supercam” S350 drones in early 2024.[126] Mashovets stated that Belarusian artillery brigades are currently equipped with quadcopter drones that do not provide adequate fire control and adjustment and that the Russian-produced drones have an increased range. Mashovets added that Belarusian forces are also testing the Belarusian-produced Volat V2 armored personnel carrier at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1]  https://t.me/otarnavskiy/354 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[2]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[3]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036KfemUabt3tVEWTuzf... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0P7Ai2W5xERok38bmoa7... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gjV3tuoLYDrq26W7GsQ...

[4]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12516 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12497 ; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69780 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/976 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104620 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16641 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/29587

[5]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12537

[6]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/rosijski-okupanty-chotyry-razy-namagalysya-vidnovyty-vtracheni-ranishe-pozycziyi-u-rajoni-robotynogo-oleksandr-shtupun/

[7]  https://isw.pub/UkrWar101223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102123

[8]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[9]  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67488646; https://storage.googlea... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[10]  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[11]  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[12] y.  https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/11/23/mironov-i-deti/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage ;  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3404 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42804 ; h... https://www.severreal.org/a/vazhnye-istorii-deputat-mironov-usynovil-poh...

[13]  https://twitter.com/mironov_ru/status/1727649749107405152

[14]  https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[15]  https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust23; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102622; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111222

[16]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/ukrayinskyj-povitryanyj-shhyt-staye-sylnishym-za-pidsumkamy-ramshtajnu-stvoreno-koalicziyu-ppo-prezydent/ ;  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/uspih-nashogo-maksymalnogo-yednannya/ ;  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/22/rustem-umyerov-rozpoviv-pro-osnovni-rezultaty-17-yi-zustrichi-kontaktnoyi-grupy-z-pytan-oborony-ukrayiny/

[17]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/volodymyr-zelenskyj-posylennya-ppo-cze-najkrashha-strategichna-investycziya-v-bezpeku/

[18]  https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/3015 ; https://t.me/spravdi/34838 ; https://t.me/rustem_umerov_mo/324?single

[19]  http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72800

[20]  https://t.me/rybar/54424 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/11/2023/655de2d29a794726821e31cf

[21]  io/news/2023/11/23/v-minske-proshel-sammit-odkb-na-kotorom-ne-bylo-armenii-v-kremle-skazali-chto-sozhaleyut-ob-etom ;  https://tass dot ru/politika/19364435

[22]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[23]  https://t.me/youlistenedmayak/29551 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/23/v-minske-proshel-sammit-odkb-na-kotorom-ne-bylo-armenii-v-kremle-skazali-chto-sozhaleyut-ob-etom ;  https://tass dot ru/politika/19364435

[24]  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[25]  https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19362479 ;  https://t.me/readovkanews/69802

[26]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/ ; https://archive.ph/14Cs9

[27]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[28]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/ ;  https://www1.hkexnews dot hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2008/0229/01186_295219/c118.pdf

[29]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[30]  https://t.me/Aksenov82/3558 ; https://t.me/rbc_news/84650 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/24/russia-crimea-tunnel-china/

[31]  https://yle dot fi/a/74-20061648 ;  https://yle dot fi/a/74-20061790

[32]  https://www.tv2 dot no/nyheter/innenriks/store-apner-for-a-stenge-grensen-til-russland/16241924/

[33]  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/23/finland-russia-border-fr... https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/estonia-accuses-russia-wea...

[34]  https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/estonia-accuses-russia-helping-migr...

[35]  https://www.hs dot fi/politiikka/art-2000010015707.html

[36]  https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1916562/

[37]  https://isw.pub/UkrWar112023

[38]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[39]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[40]  https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/323

[41]  https://t.me/readovkanews/69861 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/11/24/politsiya-ustroila-reyd-na-sklade-wildberries-v-podmoskovie-rabotayuschim-tam-migrantam-vydali-povestki-v-voenkomat

[42]  https://t.me/bazabazon/23176

[43]  https://t.me/bazabazon/23176 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/23168

[44]  https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/933030

[45]  https://t.me/breakingmash/49613

[46]  https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/933030

[47]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[48]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[49]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[50]  https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6352767

[51]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[52]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[53]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616

[54]  https://t.me/notes_veterans/13679

[55]  https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1422

[56]  https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4189

[57]  https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/15319 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=885352229454340

[58]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32771 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32783 ; http...

[59]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomos... https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ;  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12527

[60]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32771 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/32784

[61] https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727431258094096727; https://twitte...

[62]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312 ; ht...

[63]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[64]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/1... https://t.me/dva_majors/29587

[65]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[66]  https://suspilne dot media/624211-vijskovi-rf-vikoristovuut-nicni-droni-kamikadze-situacia-na-doneckomu-napramku/ ; https://suspilne dot media/624057-rosijski-okupanti-pocinaut-gnati-pihotu-na-oboh-flangah-bahmuta-nacalnik-stabu-artilerii-4-brigadi-ngu-rubiz/

[67]  https://suspilne dot media/624211-vijskovi-rf-vikoristovuut-nicni-droni-kamikadze-situacia-na-doneckomu-napramku/

[68]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32799

[69]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57079 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11303 ; https://t...

[70]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12497

[71]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16641

[72]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[73]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https:/... https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ;  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/5231...

[74]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/16616 ; https:/... https://t.me/TRO_DPR/13280 ; https://t.me/dntskmedia/210 ;  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52313 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828 ;... https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12537 ;  https://t.me/rybar/54467 ; https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535 ; https://t.me/...

[75]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12516 ; https://t.me/voenkorKot...

[76]  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57059

[77]  https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12483 ; https://t.me/negumanita...

[78]  https://t.me/vozhak_Z/535

[79]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4947

[80]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

[81]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16652

[82]  https://www.unian dot ua/war/viyna-v-ukrajini-ochilnik-avdijivskoji-mva-rozkriv-osoblivosti-tretoji-hvili-ataki-voroga-na-misto-12465069.html ;  https://uazmi dot org/news/post/deb6e23cc6342579fa47d4729e851ee9

[83]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[84]  https://t.me/wargonzo/16616

[85]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036KfemUabt3tVEWTuzf...

[86]  https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/262 ;  https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57117

[87]  https://t.me/readovkanews/69780; https://t.me/readovkanews/69828; http...

[88]  https://t.me/voin_dv/6052

[89]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32769; https://t.me/mod_russia/32804

[90]  https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/52312

[91]  https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/7773

[92]  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4965; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/4970

[93]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02HKTPFWmgq4q16wKZqE...

[94]  https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727442323532058769; https://t.me/B...

[95]  https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727660505400062155; https://t.me/B...

[96]  https://t.me/vrogov/12990; https://t.me/dva_majors/29520; https://t.me...

[97]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32805; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua...

[98]  https://t.me/rybar/54430; https://t.me/dva_majors/29577; https://t.me/... ttps://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12527; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-...

[99]  https://t.me/Dnepro_Rub/1557; https://twitter.com/foosint/status/172791... https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1727984954976403787

[100]  https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2194; https://t.me/rodinarussia27/2197

[101]  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MHnF4AQYCC2nz5uW938...

[102]  https://t.me/rybar/54448

[103]  https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1466

[104]  https://t.me/mod_russia/32805; https://t.me/mod_russia/32794

[105]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[106]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[107]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[108]  https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/11/23/voyenna-rozvidka-ukrayiny-pid-chas-kiberspeczoperacziyi-otrymala-dostup-do-zakrytyh-dokumentiv-rosaviacziyi/ ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voienna-rozvidka-ukrainy-zdiisnyla-kiberspetsoperatsiiu-shchodo-rosaviatsii-sanktsii-pryskoriuiut-aviakolaps-rf.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3122 ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/3126

[109]  https://t.me/s/uac_ru; https://ria dot ru/20231122/vks-1910966961.html; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104499; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/104496

[110]  https://zona dot media/news/2023/11/24/4k ; https://t.me/severrealii/21462 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/56851 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42893

[111]  https://zona dot media/news/2023/11/24/4k ; https://t.me/severrealii/21462 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/56851 ; https://t.me/astrapress/42893

[112]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[113]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[114]  https://t.me/bbcrussian/56814

[115]  https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3405

[116]  https://t.me/sotaproject/69739

[117]  https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16548 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/16554

[118]  https://rostec dot ru/news/rostekh-vpervye-pokazal-nosimyy-antidronnyy-kompleks-chistyulya/

[119]  https://rostec dot ru/news/rostekh-vpervye-pokazal-nosimyy-antidronnyy-kompleks-chistyulya/

[120]  https://t.me/istories_media/4275

[121]  https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-pragnut-zbilshyty-kilkist-ukrayinskyh-ditej-zaluchenyh-do-program-promyvky-mizkiv/

[122]  https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/rosiyany-pragnut-zbilshyty-kilkist-ukrayinskyh-ditej-zaluchenyh-do-program-promyvky-mizkiv/

[123]  https://t.me/sons_fatherland/11253

[124]  https://t.me/pushilindenis/4030 ; https://www.mid dot ru/ru/about/educational/

[125]  https://t.me/andriyshTime/15388

[126]  https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1425

First refuelling for Russia’s Akademik Lomonosov floating NPP

!{Model.Description}

The FNPP includes two KLT-40S reactor units. In such reactors, nuclear fuel is not replaced in the same way as in standard NPPs – partial replacement of fuel once every 12-18 months. Instead, once every few years the entire reactor core is replaced with and a full load of fresh fuel.

The KLT-40S reactor cores have a number of advantages compared with standard NPPs. For the first time, a cassette core was used, which made it possible to increase the fuel cycle to 3-3.5 years before refuelling, and also reduce by one and a half times the fuel component in the cost of the electricity produced. The operating experience of the FNPP provided the basis for the design of the new series of nuclear icebreaker reactors (series 22220). Currently, three such icebreakers have been launched.

The Akademik Lomonosov was connected to the power grid in December 2019, and put into commercial operation in May 2020.

Electricity generation from the FNPP at the end of 2023 amounted to 194 GWh. The population of Pevek is just over 4,000 people. However, the plant can potentially provide electricity to a city with a population of up to 100,000. The FNPP solved two problems. Firstly, it replaced the retiring capacities of the Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant, which has been operating since 1974, as well as the Chaunskaya Thermal Power Plant, which is more than 70 years old. It also supplies power to the main mining enterprises located in western Chukotka. In September, a 490 km 110 kilovolt power transmission line was put into operation connecting Pevek and Bilibino.

Image courtesy of TVEL

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Treasures of the Moscow Metro: Orange Line stations that honor the Arctic and Baltic

Medvdedkovo.

The interior decoration of Medvedkovo station is devoted to the severe and unforgiving nature of the Russian North. On the walls one sees eight metallic bas-reliefs with a polar bear on an ice floe, the hunt for snow gooses, reindeer sledding and more.

This is one of the most lavishly decorated stations on the Orange Line. The walls have 48 mosaics devoted to Russian cities that surround Moscow, including their coats of arms. Near each mosaic stands the name of the city.

There’s a large colorful mosaic of girls in traditional Russian dresses above the entrance to the platform. The image on the opposite side depicts medieval Russian horsemen and a chronicler. This image is devoted to the ancient epic Slavic poem,   The Tale of Igor's Campaign .

Botanichesky Sad

This station brings one to the largest botanical garden in Europe, and the station’s interior decoration is devoted to the topic of natural beauty. On the walls, one sees metallic bas-reliefs with simple images of flowers, apples and grapes.

Rizhskiy Railway Station is located at this metro stop. From here, trains travel to the Latvian capital. No surprise that the station, which was designed by the Soviet Latvian architects, was dedicated to that Baltic country and its capital, Riga.

The yellow and brown colors epitomize different kinds of amber that is plentiful in the Baltic Sea region. On the columns one sees images related to Latvia: Riga’s port, the Latvian Academy of Science, the Central Market (one of the largest in Europe), Old Riga and more.

Tretyakovskaya

This station leads to the famous State Tretyakov Gallery, the foremost repository of Russian fine art anywhere in the world. The station walls are decorated with the bronze bas-reliefs of Russian artists, sculptors and icon painters. Above the portal on the way to the escalators one sees a large image of the Tretyakov Gallery.

This station brings you to the famous Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy (VDNKH) – one of the world’s largest exhibition centers. During the Soviet period it represented the best industrial achievements of all Soviet Republics. Today, it offers visitors a wide range of activities, from shopping to shows and skating, and other sport activities.

Despite its name, the station is modestly decorated. At the exit one sees a huge modern (1997) ceramic image. Made according to traditions of the Old Russian style of Gzhel, the image depicts the 19 th   century market, as well as several Russian monasteries. 

Besides Moscow and St. Petersburg, several other Russian cities have metro systems, and most stations are masterpieces of art and architecture. Find out more about them.

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